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ABSTRACT 
 
With the international platform for cross border investment and economic development 
growing year on year at a steady pace, it has become apparent that bilateral income tax 
treaties do not always operate effectively in multilateral tax situations. Global transactions 
involving more than two states are certainly not uncommon and it could be said that the most 
fundamental issue in international taxation is double taxation resulting from the taxing rights 
of different tax jurisdictions that ‘overlap’ with regard to, generally speaking, one taxpayer or 
one declared income stream.  Multilateral tax situations, commonly known as triangular 
cases, occur where tax incidence on a particular stream of income is triggered in three 
countries. These situations typically arise where a person who is a tax resident in two 
respective countries for tax purposes (a dual resident), or a person who is a tax resident in 
one country and has a permanent establishment in another, is earning revenue of which the 
source is in a third country.  Taxing rights and jurisdictions of the three countries involved 
could potentially be in conflict with each other and therefore such situations may bring about 
lawful international triangular taxation or double taxation which will inevitably discourage 
enterprises from continuing investment and development internationally.   
 
Broad multilateral treaties in the income tax arena are not common1, and most treaties are 
still of a bilateral nature, i.e. generally addressing tax scenarios where only two specific 
countries are involved. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (’the 
OECD’)Model Tax Convention states this:  
 
There are no reasons to believe that the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention involving all Member 
countries could now be considered practicable. The Committee therefore considers that bilateral 
conventions are still a more appropriate way to ensure the elimination of double taxation at the 
international level.2 
 
Key Words: Bilateral Tax Treaties; Multilateral Taxation; Triangular Cases; International 
Double Taxation; Permanent Establishments; OECD Model Tax Convention; Double Tax 
Agreements; Cross Border Investment; Tax Avoidance. 
  
                                                     
1BLOOMBERG, BNA, Morrison PD, Esq, 1 October 2013, http://www.bna.com/beps-part-
multilateral-n17179877447/, (Accessed 1 December 2013 
2OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Introduction, Multilateral convention, I-11, Para 40.    
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GLOSSARY 
 
BILATERAL TAX TREATY 
An agreement between two countries for the avoidance of double taxation pertaining to the 
way in which the countries cater for the differences in treatment of income or capital in terms 
of their own domestic legislation.  A tax treaty may be titled a convention, treaty or an 
agreement.3 
 
DOUBLE TAXATION 
Double taxation arises when comparable taxes are imposed in two or more states on the 
same taxpayer in respect of the same taxable income or capital4, e.g. where income is 
taxable in the source country and in the country of residence of the recipient of such 
income. 
 
DUAL RESIDENT TRIANGULAR CASES 
Refer to scenarios where a person who is a tax resident in two respective countries is 
earning revenue of which the source is in a third country. Taxation is typically triggered in all 
three of the countries involved with unrelieved double or triangular taxation as a possible 
consequence. 
 
MULTILATERAL TAX TREATY 
An agreement between more than two countries for the avoidance of double taxation 
pertaining to the way in which the countries cater for the differences in treatment of income 
or capital in terms of their own domestic legislation.  A tax treaty may be titled a convention, 
treaty or an agreement.5 
 
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.6 
 
PARTIAL RESIDENCE BASIS OF TAXATION 
Partial residence basis of taxation refers to the tax treatment of a permanent establishment 
in accordance with Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Like a resident of the 
permanent establishment state, the permanent establishment is taxed on its worldwide 
                                                     
3 OECD website, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#T, accessed 24 March 2014. 
4 OECD website, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#D, accessed 24 March 2014. 
5 OECD website, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#T, accessed 24 March 2014. 
6Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 26 
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income but, unlike a resident, the permanent establishment has no corresponding 
entitlement to treaty benefits in terms of treaties concluded between the permanent 
establishment state and other states. 
 
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT TRIANGULAR CASES 
Permanent establishment triangular cases refer to scenarios where a person who is a tax 
resident in one country has a permanent establishment in a second country and earns 
revenue that is attributable to that permanent establishment of which the source is in a third 
country. Taxation is typically triggered in all three of the countries involved with unrelieved 
double or triangular taxation as a possible consequence. 
 
TRIANGULAR TAXATION 
Triangular taxation occurs in international triangular tax cases when the same person is 
taxed three times on the same stream of income by three different states with no relief 
measures provided by any of the three states. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context of the study 
Several challenges are triggered by globalisation today, one of which, complex cross-border 
taxation, brought on by extensive international investment and development, represents 
probably the most fundamental issue. In particular, the vexed issue of triangular cases has 
drawn considerable attention over the last two decades but, with respect to different aspects 
of these situations, still gives rise to many unresolved questions. The term 'triangular cases' 
refers to situations where tax incidence on one particular stream of income is typically 
triggered in three countries with unrelieved double or triangular taxation as a possible 
consequence (the extent of the double or triangular taxation depending on the relief 
measures provided by the relevant states for taxes paid in the other states).  
International taxation issues arise largely due to two main bases of taxation, known 
respectively as sourced-based taxation and residence-based taxation, as well as the 
applicability of bilateral tax treaties to multilateral situations. The concepts of source and 
residence arise from domestic tax law provisions and they are fundamental causes of 
international juridical double taxation.  Domestic tax law provisions distinguish between two 
types of taxpayers, non-residents and residents, as well as source taxation and worldwide 
taxation.  In South Africa, generally a residency test attempts to ensure certainty and 
predictability on the one hand and to prevent manipulation on the other.7 Unfortunately, 
conflict exists between these two goals, and in order to balance these rival considerations, 
the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) makes use of two tests as per the definition of 
a ‘resident’ in section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) for determining the tax 
residency of a person other than a natural person (referred to in this report as ‘legal 
persons’): the test of incorporation and the test of place of effective management. The 
second test is generally considered to be more challenging to manipulate, but has presented 
complex issues of general interpretation and practical application, both in South Africa and 
elsewhere.8 
 
Double taxation can take different forms and occur in many different situations, both 
domestically and internationally. Juridical double taxation is described as cases where the 
same income is being taxed twice in the hands of the same taxpayer, whereas economic 
                                                     
7 Van der Merwe BA, ‘The Phrase “place of effective management“: Effectively Explained?’,18 South 
African Mercantile Law Journal, 121 at p. 124-125 (2006)  
8South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011  
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double taxation refers to cases where the same income is being taxed twice in the hands of 
two different taxpayers.  Generally, most bilateral tax treaties currently in force seek to 
eliminate/reduce international juridical double taxation between two countries, but also 
international economic double taxation in some instances. 
Concluding double tax agreements is a formalized way for different countries to agree on a 
method of reducing or eliminating the risk of double taxation. Double taxation may occur for 
any of the following reasons: residence-residence conflict, source-resident conflict, source-
source conflict and, as briefly mentioned above, triangular cases. In some cases, a country 
may have a source-residence conflict with one country and a source-source conflict with 
another country, which could trigger an incremental layer of unrecoverable taxes, unless 
some form of relief is provided.  As mentioned before, most treaties are bilateral in nature 
and would not necessarily address triangular cases and thus one stream of income is 
potentially taxable in three different jurisdictions with double or triangular taxation as a result.  
The issue that needs to be addressed is how triangular taxation can be avoided by way of 
tax credit/exemption mechanisms in tax treaties. More specifically, how can credit/exemption 
mechanisms contained in a single bilateral tax treaty be applied to triangular cases involving 
multiple countries, seeing that a bilateral treaty does not normally cover the taxing rights of a 
third/additional state.   
From a South African perspective, National Treasury proposed a new ‘Gateway to Africa’ 
initiative in 2010 as part of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 7 of 2010.9 This initiative 
is intended to make South Africa a more attractive base for investment into other African 
countries by both domestic and foreign investors.10 As mentioned, place of effective 
management is one of the two tests used by SARS to determine whether or not a person 
other than a natural person is a tax resident in South Africa. In addition, the place of effective 
management test is also used as the ‘tie breaker’ rule to determine residency in many of the 
treaties that South Africa has in place with other countries, particularly those agreements 
which are based on the OECD (2012)Model Tax Conventionon Income and on Capital, 
(updated 2010)(‘the OECD Model Tax Convention’).11 
As per Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention with regard to the persons covered by 
the convention, a prerequisite of bilateral tax treaties is that the taxpayer is a resident of at 
                                                     
9South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011 p. 2. 
10South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011 p. 2. 
11South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011, p. 2.  
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least one of the contracting states. If this relationship does not exist between the taxpayer 
and one of the countries in a triangular case, the treaty benefits cannot be utilised and thus 
the inevitable juridical double taxation that may occur, could remain unrelieved. It is 
therefore clear that internationally there is a need for specific, updated guidelines on 
triangular tax scenarios where only one bilateral tax treaty is available. These guidelines 
should also serve as an accelerator for renewed multilateral treaty negotiations with a focus 
on addressing triangular cases.  
 
This research report will aim to investigate the applicability of a single bilateral tax treaty that 
is based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, to a triangular tax scenario. The report will 
not evaluate an existing bilateral tax treaty between two specific countries, but will apply the 
research methodology to the OECD Model Tax Convention seeing that many international 
bilateral tax treaties (between member states and non-member states) are largely based on 
the provisions of the convention.12 This issue arises because most treaties are bilateral in 
nature, and yet many international business transactions are multilateral in nature. Existing 
proposals for solving triangular cases, as proposed by the OECD and tax authors, will 
therefore be evaluated in terms of their compatibility with bilateral treaties. To a lesser 
extent, the current interpretation of the phrase ‘POEM’ by SARS will also be briefly 
discussed as the author believes that the possibility of this contributing to occurrences of 
possible double or triangular taxation situations where South Africa is involved should be 
considered. Throughout the report, discussions and examples will be limited to typical 
dividend and interest income streams (an in depth discussion of each cross border income 
type will be outside the scope of this report). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
1.2.1 Main problem 
 
The research report will be an investigation into the ability of a bilateral tax treaty, 
which is based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, to provide sufficient relief in 
triangular cases. An examination of the causes and consequences of triangular cases 
will be done in order to establish what tax treaty applicability problems they may entail. 
The report is not aimed at finding a new solution to triangular cases, but at evaluating 
the current existing solutions to these cases with reference to their compatibility with 
bilateral treaties. The author will attempt to point out the reasons why double taxation 
                                                     
12OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Introduction, para. 14.  
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could still occur in triangular tax scenarios with only bilateral tax treaty provisions at the 
disposal of the relevant parties. 
 
1.2.2 The Sub-problems 
 
A number of sub-problems will assist in attempting to answer the main research 
problem.   
 
The first sub-problem is: How does Triangular Taxation arise? What are the various 
causes of triangular taxation?  Two different scenarios, dual resident triangular cases 
and permanent establishment triangular cases, will be examined. As part of this 
investigation, the report will also evaluate SARS’s current approach to its interpretation 
of the term ‘Place of Effective Management’ as contained in Interpretation Note 6 to the 
Act. 
 
The second sub-problem is: Do bilateral tax treaties, as negotiated between two 
countries and that are based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, provide sufficient 
relief for multilateral tax cases, i.e. triangular cases involving a third country?  An 
examination will be done of existing proposals for solving triangular cases as proposed 
by the OECD and tax authors. The compatibility of these solutions with bilateral tax 
treaties, as applicable in a multilateral tax situation, will be considered.  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
 
The research methodology will be an extensive investigation of the causes and impact of 
triangular taxation incidents, as well as the applicability of bilateral tax treaties (that are 
based on the OECD Model Tax Convention) to these situations.  Background information 
that will portray the origin and consequences of such cases will be collected from various 
electronic media portals, research studies and available literature.  The latest news articles 
and developments in the affected legislation and guidelines, as well as reference to recent 
international double/triangular taxation cases as concluded by various courts internationally, 
will be included in the research analysis in order to draw a conclusion.  
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
 
The remaining chapters will be arranged as follows: 
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Chapter 2 will investigate the origin and nature of bilateral tax treaties. Considering 
triangular cases and specifically the taxing jurisdiction of the third country involved (source 
country), the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as specific 
provisions in the OECD Model Tax Convention, will be evaluated in order to better 
understand the applicability of bilateral tax treaties. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine dual resident triangular cases where a person who is a tax resident 
in two respective countries, is earning revenue of which the source is in a third country.  For 
treaty purposes, residence is determined in accordance with Article 4 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention (or its equivalent) by reference to residence under domestic laws and thus, 
a person who is resident in two states under their respective domestic laws will generally 
also be a dual resident for treaty purposes. Article 4 contains tie‐breaker rules which are 
intended to assign the residence of a dual resident person to one of the residence states for 
the purposes of the treaty between those two states.  In some situations the applicable 
tie‐breaker rule may not effectively assign residence to a particular state and the person 
involved may continue to be a dual‐resident for the purposes of the treaty. For natural 
persons this risk could be remedied by mutual agreement between the tax authorities 
involved. In the case of persons other than natural persons, the place of effective 
management tie-breaker test is to be utilised to answer the question of dual residence of the 
taxpayer, but this solution is reliant on compatible interpretation of the phrase place of 
effective management by both tax authorities involved. 
 
Chapter 3 will also briefly examine SARS’s current approach to the term place of effective 
management,which, despite its widespread use, has never had a universally accepted 
meaning.  Various criticisms of SARS’ interpretation will be evaluated as well as the impact 
of this on using the term place of effective management as the tie-breaker rule in many 
international tax treaties, as is the case in the OECD Model Tax Convention.13 
 
Chapter 4will examine permanent establishment triangular cases where a person who is a 
tax resident in one country, has a permanent establishment in a second country and earns 
revenue of which the source is in a third country.  In a permanent establishment triangular 
case, tax may be imposed under the respective domestic legislation of all three countries 
involved.  In the residence country, tax is likely to be imposed on the basis of the residence 
of the person earning the income, while the source country would generally impose tax on a 
source basis(particularly where passive income such as dividends and interest is involved). 
                                                     
13OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Article 4, para. 3. 
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In the permanent establishment state, it is the business activities carried on there by the 
person earning the income and the link between the income and those business activities, 
which is likely to trigger tax. The residence country may provide double taxation relief 
unilaterally under its domestic law, but even then the relief may not be sufficient and 
unrelieved double taxation could still arise. 
 
In chapters 3 and 4 the author will attempt to point out specific issues with or characteristics 
of triangular cases that could affect the applicability of bilateral tax treaties. 
 
Chapter 5 will consider the compatibility of current solutions to triangular cases, as proposed 
by the OECD and respective tax authorswith the bilateral nature of tax treaties as examined 
in chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 6 will summarise the findings of the research and propose areas requiring further 
research. 
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2 BILATERAL NATURE OF TAX TREATIES 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Vogel stated that it should never be forgotten that each individual treaty is autonomous, that 
it concerns important and conflicting interests of the two contracting states, and that a 
coordination of these interests will usually be reached only after difficult and protracted 
negotiations.14The bilateral nature of tax treaties as concluded between two parties is 
oftenconsidered to be not only the main cause of the issues arising in triangular cases,15 but 
that triangular cases are actually a direct result of the bilateral nature of these conventions.16 
Generally theprovisions contained in a double tax agreement only consider bilateral 
situations and are not intended to interact with nor take into account the effect of provisions 
of other agreements. 
 
This chapter will briefly investigate the origin and nature of bilateral tax treaties. The main 
roots of triangular cases lie in the principles of international treaty law and the limited scope 
of their application. Double tax treaties are international agreements17 and therefore their 
creation and consequences are determined according to the rules contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 196918. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties contains the rules of interpretation of double taxation treaties and is regarded as 
declaratory of customary international law.19 These rules are even referred to by courts of 
nations which have not yet ratified the treaty.20 
 
2.2 The development of tax treaties 
 
Before examining the development of tax treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and how it relates to tax treaties will be briefly examined.The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treatieshas been in force since 27 January 1980 and more than 100 parties have 
signed the convention.The convention was adopted on 22 May 1969 and opened for 
signature on 23 May 1969 by the United NationsConference on the Law of Treaties. The 
                                                     
14Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 43. 
15OECD 'Triangular Cases' Model Tax Convention: Four Related Studies (Paris, OECD, 1992), para 
1. 
16Garcia Prats FA, 'Triangular Cases and Residence as a Basis for Alleviating International Double 
Taxation. Rethinking the Subjective Scope of Double Tax Treaties' (1994) 22 Intertax 473.  
17Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 2(1)(a) 
18Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Articles 1 and 2(1)(a) 
19Baker P, Double Taxation Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Edition 1994), p. 22 
20Vogel K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd Edition 1997), Introduction, 68 at 35 
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Conference was convened pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 2166 (XXI) of 5 
December 1966 and 2287 (XXII) of 6 December 1967. The Conference held two sessions, 
both at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna, the first session from 26 March to 24 May 1968 and the 
second session from 9 April to 22 May 1969.21The International Court of Justice has in 
several cases referred to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties without examining 
whether the litigants were parties to it.22 In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case the Court 
observed:23 
 
[The Court] needs only to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to hold that some 
of the rules laid down in that Convention might be considered as a codification of existing customary 
law.24 
 
The Court’s opinion, together with the relatively high number of parties to the Convention, 
suggests that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the current general 
international law of treaties and it is confirmed by the 1969 Convention’s substantive 
provisions that were by consensus copied into the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations.25 
 
A series of model income tax treaties was first developed with the support of the various 
committees of the League of Nations following the First World War.26 The efforts of the 
Organization of European Economic Cooperation and its successor organization, the 
OECD,to developa system for the avoidance of double taxation picked up where the 
preparatory research of the League of Nations left off.27 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
submitted a series of model treaty articles in four interim reports between 1956 and 1961 
and a summary report in 1963 to which the complete model treaty, the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and an official Commentary were appended.28  The OECD Council 
recommended that member states continue their efforts to enter bilateral double tax 
agreements, that they adopt as the basis for their negotiations the model submitted by the 
                                                     
21Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969 
22United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Historic Archives, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Professor Zemanek K. 
23United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Historic Archives, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Professor Zemanek K. 
24 I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 38, para. 46 
25United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Historic Archives, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Professor Zemanek K. 
26 Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 11. 
27Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 11. 
28Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 11. 
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Fiscal Committee as interpreted by the Commentaries in the Report, and that they make 
allowances for the limitations and reservations contained in the Commentary.29  Today the 
OECD Model Tax Convention reflects the basic structure of bilateral tax treaties and this 
notion is confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Crown Forest 
Industries Ltd. whodescribed the OECD Model Tax Convention as an instrument recognized 
worldwide as: 
 
 A basic document of reference in the negotiation, application and interpretation of multilateral and bilateral 
tax conventions.30 
 
2.3 The bilateral nature of tax treaties 
 
The author performed an examination of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
OECD Model Tax Convention as well as literature on double tax agreements written by 
authors such as Klaus Vogel in order to establish which provisions contained in treaties 
effectively determine the nature of the treaty, specifically the bilateral nature thereof. Based 
on this examination, it is submitted that the specific characteristics as discussed below 
appear in essence to define the ‘bilateralism’ of tax treaties. 
 
2.3.1 EligibleContracting Parties 
 
One such characteristic is the bilateralism of treaties, according to which treaty 
benefits may not be extended to residents of third states. The bilateral effect of 
international treaties is intended to result in treaties having an effect only between the 
contracting states and not for third states that did not participate in the treaty-making 
process.31Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesreads, ‘The present 
Convention applies to treaties between States’. It is submitted that a key definition in 
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that of a ‘third state’, seems 
to shed light on how many ‘States’ are referred to in Article 1.  Notwithstanding the 
definition of the term ‘third state’, because it is called third state and actually being 
defined is decisive.It is further submitted that the definition of ‘third State’, as can be 
found in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that means ‘a State 
                                                     
29Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 11. 
30 Her Majesty The Queen v. Crown Forest Industries Ltd. [1995] 2 SCR 802 (SCC) 23940, page 31, 
para 55.  
31Martin Jimenez AJ, Garcia Prats FA and José M, Carrero C, 'Triangular Cases, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law: The Saint-Gobain Decision of the ECJ' (2001) 55 Bulletin for International Taxation 241, 245. 
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not a party to the treaty’ implies that anything more than two states would not be a 
party to the specific treaty.  
 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires all treaties to be 
performed by the parties to it in good faith and it is therefore submitted that tax treaties 
are also governed by this principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’: 'Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith'.32 This 
principle of ‘good faith’ is repeated in Article 31(1) which reads: 
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
It is important and relevant to note that, in accordance with these Articles, the extent 
of the binding effect of a treaty will be limited to the parties to it, which is limited to 
two parties as mentioned in the opening paragraph of chapter 2.3.1. It is submitted 
that this principle entitles states to require that obligations in terms of a tax treaty be 
respected and that it will be adhered to by both treaty partners in good faith.33 
 
In addition to the implications of Articles 1, 2 and 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties as discussed thus far in chapter 2.3.1, Articles 34 to 38 specifically 
address the application of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties to third states. Article 34 states that ‘A treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.’ In respect of obligations 
arising for a third state from a provision of a treaty, the third state needs to ‘expressly 
accept that obligation in writing’.34 In respect of rights arising from a treaty provision, 
the third state needs to ‘assent’ thereto, although the assent will be presumed unless 
the contrary is indicated.35 It is therefore submitted that the bilateral nature of tax 
treaties is clear from these provisions and that the Vienna convention was intended 
to generally impact only the two contracting parties.  
 
Furthermore, Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention refers to one or both of 
the contracting states, implying a maximum of two parties, and reads as follows: 
 
This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting 
States. 
                                                     
32Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 26 
33Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 26 
34Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 35 
35Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 22 May 1969, Article 36(1) 
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It is also clear that the prerequisite for treaty entitlement is residency in at least one 
of the contracting states and will therefore be applicableonly to the residents of those 
two countries that concluded the agreement.However, it has also been said that it is 
difficult to find definitive evidence of existing principles in the international law 
according to which the tax conventions should be strictly limited to persons who are 
residents of the contracting states.36In the Commerzbank37 case, treaty benefits were 
extended to a resident of a country which was not party to the applicable treaty 
related to the case.38 Although the tax authorities alleged the tax treaties to be limited 
in the scope of their application, the tax treaty at issue did not contain a provision 
similar to Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the court did not see the 
principle of relative effect of the tax treaties to be in place.39The OECD is of the 
opinion that tax treaties cannot be extended to third country residents.40Baker points 
out that even without Article 1 tax treaties are meant to apply only to the residents of 
the contracting states.41 
 
The application of Article 1 can also be viewed from a more historical development 
point of viewthat would lead one to believe that the actual inclusion of the article inthe 
1963 OECD Model Tax Convention was in fact a confirmation of the bilateral nature 
of tax treaties.42The Commentary explained that for practical reasons it is preferable 
to apply the convention to the persons who are residents of the contracting states. It 
is unclear as to what exactly these practical reasons are as it has never been fully 
explained, but apparently it was to avoid the uncertainty with regard to who may 
claim treaty benefits.43 Hattingh is of the opinion that Article 1 was included in tax 
treaties to narrow down the range of persons who are entitled to treaty benefits by 
                                                     
36Baker P, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Ed., 1994, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 1-05 
37IRC v Commerzbank AG: IRC v Banco Do Brasil [1990] STC 285. 
38Baker P, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Ed., 1994, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 1-02. 
39Baker P, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Ed., 1994, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 1-02. 
40OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Introduction, Multilateral convention, C(24)-1, para 2. 
41Baker P, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Ed., 1994, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 1-06. 
42Hattingh JP, 'Article 1 of the OECD Model: Historical Background and the Issues Surrounding it' 
(2003) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 215, 217. 
43Hattingh JP, 'Article 1 of the OECD Model: Historical Background and the Issues Surrounding it' 
(2003) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 218. 
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determining those who have an ‘economic allegiance’ to either oneof the contracting 
states.44 
 
Based on the above discussion and apparent implication of the various Articles of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as Article 1 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, it is clear that the rights and obligations contained in international 
tax treaties are only applicable to the residents and tax authorities of the specific 
states that have explicitly agreed and accepted to be a party to the treaty and be 
bound by its provisions.  
 
2.3.2 Reciprocity Obligation 
 
Another expression of the bilateral nature of tax treaties can be seen in the principle 
of reciprocity. As per the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, the 
principle of reciprocity is defined as: 
 
The principle of give-and-take operates in a variety of tax contexts (particularly in the case of 
tax treaties) where an exchange of tax privileges between countries is desired. Reciprocity is a 
basis for relieving a taxpayer under domestic law, e.g. relief is granted for foreign tax if the 
other country gives corresponding or equivalent relief. 
 
It appears that the principle reflects the agreement between contracting parties of a 
treaty that the treaty obligations and benefits assumed between the treaty partners 
will be distributed betweenthem to the same extent, in equal measures. Differently 
stated, it refers to an 'interchange between the parties, i.e. giving and receiving of 
rights, benefits, concessions or advantages'.45  The principle is bilateral in scope in 
the sense that the rights and obligations are conferred to one treaty partner with the 
understanding that that party will in turn grant the same benefits to the other 
contracting party. The so-called 'formal reciprocity' means that a contracting state 
may withdraw its commitments if the other contracting state does not fulfil its own 
commitments.46 
 
                                                     
44Hattingh JP, 'Article 1 of the OECD Model: Historical Background and the Issues Surrounding it' 
(2003) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 221. 
45Dörr O, Schmalenbach K (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a commentary (Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York 2012) Art 26 marginal 34. 
46Vogel K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the OECD-, UN- and US 
Model Conventions for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital with Particular 
Reference to German Treaty Practice (3rd Ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997), Art 24 marginal 39. 
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Concluding international bilateral tax treaties entails thorough negotiations between 
the contracting states in order to reach a balanced result of the rights and obligations 
deriving from the treaty.47Being a contracting party to a treaty usually involves both 
parties waiving a certain part of their rights in favour of the other treaty partner and 
the reciprocal obligations should guarantee that both treaty partners receive equally 
beneficial treatment from the other partner.48 
 
From the above it is evident that this reciprocal principle, important for the effective 
and fair application of tax treaties, does not take cognisance of any other party 
except the two contracting states thathave explicitly agreed to adhere to the 
reciprocity obligation. 
 
2.3.3 The Non-Discrimination Provision 
 
One important function of tax treaties is to prevent discriminatory tax practices.49 The 
principle of non-discrimination governing bilateral tax treaty relations prevents the 
imposition of a larger or smaller tax burden on income attributable to a non-
resident.50 
 
Article 24(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides: 
 
Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the 
taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same 
circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision 
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of 
one or both of the Contracting States. 
 
The second sentence leads one to believe that the application of Article 24(1) is 
extended beyond the usual bilateral scope of tax treaties and applicable not only to 
the two contracting states. The OECD Commentary confirms thatthe application of 
this paragraph is not restricted by Article 1 and covers all nationals of both 
                                                     
47SA Technical ACCA, Relevant to ACCA Qualification Paper P6 (MYS), Double tax agreements, 
2012, pg. 3. 
48Vogel K, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1986, p 23. 
49 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 24, para 1. 
50 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 24, para 5. 
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contracting states regardless of their residence.51Vogel adds though that in spite of 
this provision including application to persons other than residents of the contracting 
states, i.e. taxation of a national of one of the contracting states in the other 
contracting state, it is still related to the tax relationships between the twocontracting 
states.52 Thusthe overall bilateral nature of the tax treaty is still followed. 
 
Article 24(3) reads as follows: 
 
The taxation on a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in 
the other Contracting State shall not be less favourably levied in that other State than the 
taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities. This provision 
shall not be construed as obliging a Contracting State to grant to residents of the other 
Contracting State any personal allowances, reliefs and reductions for taxation purposes on 
account of civil status or family responsibilities which it grants to its own residents. 
 
Vogelpoints out thatthe difference between Article 24(1) and 24(3) is that the former 
prohibits less favourable treatment ofnationals of the other contracting state 
regardless of their residence, while the latter prohibits it to alltax residents of the 
contracting state in question.53From Vogel’s explanation, it can be said that Article 
24(3) was not meant to be a diversion from the general bilateral scope of tax treaties 
when originally drafted, but rather to prevent discrimination as explained by the 
OECD Commentary on Article 24(3).Thesecond sentence of Article 24(1) was 
included in the provision to clarify disagreement between the OECD Member states 
on exactly who will be protected by the non-discrimination clauses in Article 24.54 
 
The OECD Commentary onArticle 24(3) states that: 
 
Strictly speaking, the type of discrimination which this paragraph is designed to end is 
discrimination based not on nationality but on the actual situs of an enterprise. It therefore 
affects without distinction, and irrespective of their nationality, all residents of a Contracting 
State who have a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State.55 
It appears necessary first to make it clear that the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 3 
must be interpreted in the sense that it does not constitute discrimination to tax non-resident 
                                                     
51 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 24 para 6. 
52Vogel K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the OECD-, UN- and US 
Model Conventions for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital with Particular 
Reference to German Treaty Practice (3rd Ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997),  Art 24 marginal 34. 
53Vogel K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the OECD-, UN- and US 
Model Conventions for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital with Particular 
Reference to German Treaty Practice (3rd Ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997),  Art 24 marginal 2. 
54Vogel K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the OECD-, UN- and US 
Model Conventions for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital with Particular 
Reference to German Treaty Practice (3rd Ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997), Art 24 marginal 31. 
55OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 24 para 33. 
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persons differently, for practical reasons, from resident persons, as long as this does not result 
in more burdensome taxation for the former than for the latter.56 
 
Furthermore, the OECD recognises that there are differences in the nature of a 
permanent establishment as opposed to that of a separate legal entity and that this 
could affect the application of equal tax treatment, as explained in the Commentary 
on Article 24(3) that says the following:  
 
The main reason for difficulty seems to reside in the actual nature of the permanent 
establishment, which is not a separate legal entity but only a part of an enterprise that has its 
head office in another State. The situation of the permanent establishment is different from that 
of a domestic enterprise, which constitutes a single entity all of whose activities, with their fiscal 
implications, can be fully brought within the purview of the State where it has its head office.57 
 
From the above discussion, it appears reasonable to conclude that the non-
discrimination article of the OECD Model Tax Convention deviates from the general 
bilateral application scope of tax treaties by possibly also affecting the rights of 
residents ofthird states, and not just those of the two contracting states. However, 
Hattingh states that the bilateral nature of tax treaties still prevails regardless of the 
provisions that are drafted otherwise.58 
 
2.3.4 Other Treaty Provisions 
 
The bilateral nature of tax treaties also appears to be evident from the general 
wording and operation of other articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention not yet 
mentioned above. 
 
One such provision is Article 4 that provides for tie-breaker rules to assign residency 
to one state where a person appears to simultaneously be a dual-resident in respect 
of both of the contracting states.59 This provision deals specifically with dual 
residency between the two contracting states and would therefore not be able to 
solve a residency conflict where a third country is involved. 
 
                                                     
56 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 24 para 34. 
57 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 24 para 39. 
58Hattingh JP, 'The Role and Function of Article 1 of the OECD Model' (2003) 57 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 546, 553. 
59OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 4 para 5. 
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The distributive rules contained in tax treaties, such as Article 7 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, operate in the same way by using terminology that constantly refer 
to 'one' or 'both' or 'the other' Contracting State.60 
 
  
                                                     
60Baker P, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law (2nd Ed., 1994, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) B-01. 
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3 DUAL RESIDENT TRIANGULAR CASES 
 
3.1 Background 
 
In a double tax agreement context, tax residence of a person is generally determined with 
reference to the domestic legislation of the countries involved.61 Dual resident triangular 
cases have been widely discussed in the available literature62 and refer to scenarios where a 
person who is a tax resident in two respective countries, is earning revenue of which the 
source is in a third country. The situation can be graphically portrayed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to the difference in criteria applied by respective countries in order to determine a 
person’s tax residency, one person could simultaneously be a dual resident in accordance 
with the domestic legislation of two countries, RC1 and RC2 as above.  If a person is such a 
so called dual resident, the person will most likely also be a dual resident for bilateral tax 
treaty purposes, unless effective tie-breaker rules apply. Tie-breaker rules could be 
effectively applied only if the relevant tax treaty provides for it, and if it is possible to factually 
determine an enterprise’s place of effective management or if the relevant tax authorities 
that are involved are able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement (mutual agreement 
                                                     
61OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 4, para 1. 
62For example, Avery Jones J and Bobbett C, 'Triangular Treaty Problems: A Summary of the 
Discussion in Seminar E at the IFA Congress in London' (1999); OECD 'Triangular Cases' Model Tax 
Convention: Four Related Studies (Paris, OECD, 1992); Van Raad, K., ‘Dual Residence and the 1977 
OECD Model Treaty Article 4(1), Second Sentence’, European Taxation 1, (1990); and Sasseville, J., 
A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues, Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, edited by Maisto, G., 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006). 
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procedures are the OECD’s alternative proposed tie-breaker clause in Article4(3)). If 
residency cannot be effectively assigned to either RC1 or RC2, the person will continue to 
be a dual resident for tax treaty purposes. This is becausetreaties refer to the contracting 
states’ domestic legislation63 as a starting point for determining residency.  For the 
discussion that follows, a dual resident is a person that is considered to be a resident in 
terms of the relevant domestic legislation of both countries RC1 and RC2. 
 
Dual resident conflicts are resolved in accordance with tie-breaker rules contained in Article 
4(2) and 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, whereby the OECD intends to assign the 
residency of a dual resident person to one of the respective countries involved. Only for 
discussion purposes in Chapter 3, it is assumed that residency is assigned to RC2 in 
accordance with the RC1-RC2 treaty as graphically illustrated above.  It is important to note 
that this assignment of residency is however applicable only to those specific two contracting 
states, i.e. RC1 and RC2. The assignment of residency should be dealt with separately for 
each treaty involved in a multilateral situation, i.e. in addition to the RC1-RC2 relationship, 
residency should also be determined in accordance with the RC1-SC and the RC2-SC 
treaties respectively.   
 
In a triangular scenario,a situation could thus occur where three bilateral tax treaties are 
applicable at the same time with reference to one taxpayer, between one source country and 
two residence countries64. The question that arises is therefore whether the dual resident 
can claim the benefits of the tax treaties concluded by both of its resident states with the 
third state from which it derives income, i.e. the RC1-SC treaty and the RC2-SC treaty.  
 
3.2 Typical Dual Resident Triangular Cases 
 
Because bilateral tax treaties are concerned with the taxing rights of the two contracting 
countries only, together with domestic legislation being the starting point of determining the 
residency of a taxpayer for treaty purposes, two significant opposing risks arise for the 
taxpayer and the relevant revenue authorities respectively, that of double taxation for the 
taxpayer, and that of tax avoidance for the relevant revenue authorities.   
 
                                                     
63OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 4 para 1. 
64Avery Jones J and Bobbett C, 'Triangular Treaty Problems: A Summary of the Discussion in 
Seminar E at the IFA Congress in London' (1999) 53 Bulletin or International Taxation 16, 19. 
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The Commentary to Article 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention specifically addresses 
dual resident triangular cases by excluding from the definition of a resident of a contracting 
state a person such as described in the second sentence of paragraph 8.2, which reads: 
 
It also excludes companies and other persons who are not subject to comprehensive liability to tax in a 
Contracting State because these persons, whilst being residents of that State under that State's tax law, 
are considered to be residents of another State pursuant to a treaty between these two States. 
 
It follows that according to the Commentary, the taxpayer is no longer fully liable to tax in 
RC1 because it is a resident of RC2 under article 4(3) of the RC1-RC2 tax treaty. It is 
submitted that the taxpayer can therefore not be regarded as a resident of contracting state 
RC1 for purposes of article 4(1) of another tax treaty to which RC1 is a party. An example of 
such a treaty would be the RC1-SC treaty in the scenario in chapter 3.1. When applying the 
RC1-SC tax treaty, the residency implications in accordance with the RC1-RC2 treaty would 
thus need to be considered. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in a case 
involving a Dutch incorporated company which was effectively managed in the Netherlands 
Antilles and which paid a dividend to its Belgian resident shareholder (February 28, 2001, 
No. 35 557, BNB 2001/295).65 The issue at hand was whether the Netherlands was entitled 
to levy Dutch dividend withholding tax on the dividend distribution by the Dutch company. 
The Supreme Court considered whether the company qualified as a resident of the 
Netherlands for purposes of the 1970 Belgium- Netherlands tax treaty. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the company did not qualify as such because it was not fully liable to tax in the 
Netherlands as a result of it being a tax resident only of the Netherlands Antilles under the 
tiebreaker clause of the tax arrangement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands (‘BRK’) 
(‘Belastingregeling voor het Koninkrijk’, this is a law containing an arrangement similar to 
double tax treaties among the Netherlandsand its overseas territories) and that the 
Netherlands could therefore not levy its dividend withholding tax. The Court reasoned that 
because the company qualified as a resident only of the Netherlands Antilles under the BRK, 
the company was in fact only subject to tax in the Netherlands on its Dutch-sourced income 
and not on its worldwide income.66 
 
In some situations, specifically with regard to companies, the applicable tie‐breaker rule of 
place of effective management may not effectively assign residence to a particular country 
                                                     
65Van Den Berg JP, Van Der Gulik B, ‘The Mutual Agreement Tiebreaker —OECD and Dutch 
Perspectives’, Tax Notes International, Volume 54, Number 5, 4 May 2009, pg. 420. 
66Van Den Berg JP, Van Der Gulik B, ‘The Mutual Agreement Tiebreaker —OECD and Dutch 
Perspectives’, Tax Notes International, Volume 54, Number 5, 4 May 2009, pg. 420. 
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and consequently a person could continue to be a dual resident for treaty purposes with 
unrelieved double taxation as a result. It is currently not clear how such a treaty that does 
not effectively assign residence between two states (for example the RC1-RC2 treaty) 
should be further applied to resolve the issue of dual residency that could potentially result in 
unrelieved double taxation. This matter is discussed further specifically from a South African 
point of view in chapter 3.5.  
 
Avery Jones and Bobbett pointout that, in a triangular situation, a dual resident person may 
be entitled to treaty benefits in accordance with both the tax treaties concluded by the 
residence states with the source state.67For example, should residency not be assigned to 
either RC1 or RC2 due to the place of effective management test not being effective, or a 
mutual agreement not being reached, paragraph 8.2 of the Commentary to Article 4(1) 
cannot apply to the dual residenttaxpayer and the taxpayer will remain fully liable to tax in 
both countries.68 In principle, the dual resident would therefore not be excluded from the 
benefits of the other two tax treaties, RC1-SC and RC2-SC, and effectively be 
simultaneously entitled to the benefits of two tax treaties. It is generally understood that in 
the case of simultaneous application of tax treaties, the more restrictive tax treaty in relation 
to the respective revenue authorities should be applied.69It follows then that the taxpayer 
might have an interest in leaving the dual residency unresolved. 
 
An example will be analysed to further explain and clarify the situation described above of 
unresolved dual residency in a triangular case: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
67Avery Jones J and Bobbett C, 'Triangular Treaty Problems: A Summary of the Discussion in 
Seminar E at the IFA Congress in London' (1999) 53 Bulletin for International Taxation 16, 19. 
68Van Den Berg JP, Van Der Gulik B, ‘The Mutual Agreement Tiebreaker —OECD and Dutch 
Perspectives’, Tax Notes International, Volume 54, Number 5, 4 May 2009, pg. 421. 
69 Van Raad C, ‘The 1992 OECD Model Treaty: Triangular Cases’, European Taxation, Sept. 1993, p. 
301. 
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Example 1: 
 
Diagram:    Facts: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis: 
 
Because paragraph 8.2 of the Commentary to Article 4(1) will not apply to X in this situation 
(the dual residency was not resolved), X is effectively entitled to claim treaty benefits from two 
bilateral treaties that are applicable at the same time. SC will be able to follow its treaty 
obligations by applying only the treaty conditions that are more favorable to the recipient of the 
income.70 The benefit to X of the unresolved dual residency in a triangular case would thus be 
that the company has a choice of which treaty benefits to apply, a 0% dividends withholding 
tax rate in terms of the RC1-SC treaty or a 10% dividends withholding tax rate in terms of the 
RC2-SC treaty.Because both RC1 and RC2 apply a participation exemption, X will not pay tax 
in terms of domestic legislation in either of the two countries.  If X then selects to apply the 
RC1-SC treaty, the company will not pay any tax on the CUR 1 000 dividend received from SC 
(CUR 1 000 * 0% withholding tax rate).Paragraph 24.1 of the Commentary to Article 4 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention as well as Article 25(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
indicates that the mutual agreement residency tiebreaker will normally be initiated by the dual 
resident entity itself. This would make sense seeing that it would be the dual resident entity 
itself and not the contractingstates thatwould be aware of the potential double taxation 
because of both contracting states wishing toimpose tax on a particular income stream.71 
 
                                                     
70See inter‐alia: Avery Jones J, Bobbett C, 'Triangular Treaty Problems: A Summary of the Discussion 
in Seminar E at the IFA Congress in London' (1999) 53 Bulletin for International Taxation 16; and 
Damen S, 'Netherlands Supreme Court Rules on the Residence of Dual Resident Companies under 
Tax Treaties with Third Countries' (2001) 55 Bulletin for International Taxation 290; and Gusmeroli M, 
'Triangular Cases and the Interest and Royalties Directive: Untying the Gordian Knot? - Part 1' (2005) 
45 European Taxation 2. 
71Van Den Berg JP, Van Der Gulik B, ‘The Mutual Agreement Tiebreaker —OECD and Dutch 
Perspectives’, Tax Notes International, Volume 54, Number 5, 4 May 2009, pg. 422. 
a)  Taxpayer X (legal entity) is a tax resident of 
both RC1 and RC2 in accordance with Article 
4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention; 
 
b)The dual residency of X has not been resolved 
by RC1 and RC2; 
 
c)X received a dividend of CUR 1000 from a 
resident company in SC; 
 
d)The RC1-SC treaty contains a 0% dividends 
withholding tax rate; 
 
e)The RC2-SC treaty contains a 10% dividends 
withholding tax rate; and 
 
f)Both RC1 and RC2 apply a full participation 
exemption to the dividends received by X. 
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Example 1 (cont.) 
 
If the residency of X was determined to be in RC2 in terms of a tie-breaker clause in the RC1-
RC2 treaty, the 10% withholding tax rate as per the RC2-SC treaty would apply and X would 
not be able to apply the treaty benefits of the RC1-SC treaty.  
 
The potential negative implication to a taxpayerin a dual resident triangular case would be 
evident in a situation where RC1 and RC2 do not apply a participation exemption to the 
dividend received by X in which case the resident would be double taxed.It poses the question 
of whether it is correct for two bilateral treaties to potentially be applied simultaneouslyto a 
dual resident taxpayer, and if not, which one should be excluded? 
 
 
Paragraph 8.2 of the Commentary to Article 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Conventionreads: 
 
It also excludes companies and other persons who are not subject to comprehensive liability to tax in a 
Contracting State because these persons, whilst being residents of that State under that State's tax law, 
are considered to be residents of another State pursuant to a treaty between these two States. 
 
Important to note though is that the application of the second sentence of the definition of a 
resident of a contracting stateappears to have ‘inherent difficulties and limitations’ and that it 
has to be interpreted in light of its ‘object and purpose’.72This object and purpose is to 
exclude from the definition persons who will not be liable to ‘comprehensive taxation (full 
liability to tax)’ in a particular state.73 For example, if residency of a taxpayer is assigned to 
RC2 in terms of the RC1–RC2 tax treaty, the taxpayer will not be a resident of a contracting 
state as defined because RC1 will not be entitled to impose full taxation on the person (as 
RC2 will be able to do), but only impose tax on income which has a source in RC1.  
 
3.3 Source of the Income 
 
It is clear from the above discussion in chapter 3.2 that a key concept in determining the 
correct application of the second sentence of Article 4(1) in the context of dual‐residents is 
the source of the income concerned. The OECD Commentary argues74 that, as a result of 
the tax treaty between the two resident countries, RC1 and RC2 for purposes of this 
discussion, the contracting state to which residency is not assigned is entitled to impose tax 
                                                     
72OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 4, para 8.3. 
73 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 4, para 8.3. 
74 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 4, para 8.2 and 8.3. 
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only on income from sources in that particular state.  A consideration that could then 
complicate this interpretation is when there is a disagreement with respect to the source of 
that income, whether or not it is in fact in RC1 or another country. An example of such 
income will be passive income such asinterest that is attributable to a permanent 
establishment in RC1 but that arises in another state, the SC (permanent establishment 
triangular cases are discussed in chapter 4).75 It could be argued that the source of the 
income is both the permanent establishment state, RC1, because of the activities of the 
permanent establishment giving rise to the income,as well as the state where it actually 
arose and was paid from.  
 
If it is argued that theinterest that is attributable to a permanent establishment in RC1 is 
sourced in the SC, the dual‐resident will be taxable in RC1 (in accordance with Article 7 of 
the OECD’s Model Tax Convention) on income which is not sourced in that state and 
therefore treaty benefits cannot be denied.76 This is because the income will be taxed in the 
permanent establishment state, RC1, as well as the SC in terms of source-based taxation. 
Double taxation relief must therefore be extended by RC1 in order to prevent double 
taxation.  Alternatively, if it is argued that the income is sourced in the state where the 
permanent establishment is located as a result of its activities there, RC1, the taxation of 
such income will result in treaty benefits under the second sentence of Article 4(1) being 
denied.77 This is because RC1 will not be a resident of a contracting state as defined 
because it will not be entitled to impose full taxation on a person, but only impose tax on 
income which has a source in RC1. The differing standpoints with regardto the source of this 
type of income clearly demonstrate that there are two possible interpretations of the second 
sentence of Article 4(1), the first of which is that treaty benefits would be allowed as long as 
income that is sourced in a state other than RC1 has accrued to the taxpayer, even if that 
income can also be considered to be sourced in RC1, the non-residence country.78 This is 
because RC1, which is the resident country for purposes of the RC1-SC treaty, will be 
                                                     
75Van Raad, K., ‘Dual Residence and the 1977 OECD Model Treaty Article 4(1), Second Sentence,’ 
30 European Taxation 1, (1990), pp. 27‐29; Sasseville, J., A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues, 
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30 European Taxation 1, (1990); Van Raad, K., ‘2008 OECD Model Tax Convention: Operation and 
Effect of Article 4(1) in Dual Residence issues under the Updated Commentary,’ 63 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 5/6, (2009), pp. 187-90. 
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obligated to extend double taxation relief for tax paid in SC. The second interpretation allows 
treaty benefits to be claimed only if it is possible to identify income that is taxable in RC1 that 
does not have its source there.79 Clearly these two interpretations would result in a 
significantly different scopeof the second sentence of Article 4(1) but are arguably both 
correct. It would then seem inappropriate to deny treaty benefits to an entity that would 
usually be entitled to them (even if the SC considers that such benefits should not be 
available) based on, what is submitted to be,one of two equally defendable interpretations of 
the wording of Article 4(1).  
 
Furthermore, if the relevant residence state, RC1, is entitled to impose tax on income that is 
attributable to a permanent establishment in that state that arises in a third state (SC), the 
risk to the taxpayer is that RC2 (which is considered to be the place of residence in 
accordance with the RC1 – RC2 treaty) may not be able to provide sufficient relief in order to 
prevent double taxation. Adequate relief can only be ensured if the permanent 
establishmentstate provides relief for tax imposed in the SC. If the RC1-SC treaty applies, it 
will require RC1 to grant relief80 for tax imposed in the SC and unrelieved double taxation will 
be prevented. However, if the dual resident is not considered to be a tax resident in RC1 for 
the purposes of that treaty, then RC1 would generally have no direct obligation to provide 
relief for tax imposed in the SC and unrelieved double taxation may very welloccur.  
 
To further explain the preceding paragraph, a numerical example will be analysed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
79Sasseville J, A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues, Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, edited by 
Maisto, G., (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006), pp. 37-61, (Chapter 3) 
80OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Articles 23 A or 23 B. 
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Example 2: 
 
Diagram:    Facts: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
Country 
RC1 
(30% corp tax rate) 
SC 
RC2 
(30% corp tax rate) 
Note: Y is not a tax resident in RC1 for purposes of the RC1-RC2 treaty and therefore RC1 is 
not considered to be the residence country for purposes of any other treaty. 
Tax imposed: CUR 1 000 * 30% CUR 1 000 * 15% 0 
Reason: 
Article 7 of the 
OECD Model Tax 
Convention 
Sourced based 
taxation 
Article 7 and 23 of the 
OECD Model Tax 
Convention 
Relief provided: CUR 0 CUR 0 CUR 1 000 is exempt 
Reason: 
RC1 is not a resident 
of a contracting state 
for the RC1-SC 
treaty, no obligation 
to provide relief. 
Not the residence 
country of either 
treaties involved, 
Article 11 provides for 
taxing of interest in the 
SC 
Tax is not imposed in 
RC2 because of the 
implications of Article 7 
and 23 of the OECD 
Model Tax 
Convention.  
Tax incurred: CUR 300 CUR 150 CUR 0 
Total tax incurred: CUR 450 Effective double taxation 
Alternative relief 
provided: 
(150)  
Reason: RC1-SC treaty being applied 
Total tax incurred: CUR 300 Effective double taxation prevented 
a)  Taxpayer Y (legal entity) is a tax resident ofboth  
RC1 and RC2 in accordance with Article4(1) of the  
OECD Model Tax Convention; 
 
b)Y’s tax residency is assigned to RC2 in termsof  
Article 4(3) of the OECDModel TaxConvention; 
 
c)  Y has a permanent establishment in RC1; 
 
d)Y received interest to the amount of  
CUR 1 000 from a resident company in SCthat is  
attributable to the permanent establishment in RC1; 
 
d)  The RC1-SC treaty contains a 10% interesttax  
rate; and 
 
e)  The RC2-SC treaty contains a 15% interest tax  
rate. 
 
RC1 – 
SCTreaty 
RC1 – RC2 Treaty 
RC2 – SC 
Treaty 
RC1 RC2 
SC 
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3.4 SARS’s Current Approach to Place of Effective Management 
 
3.4.1 Background 
 
Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention states: 
 
Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an individual is a 
resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in 
which its place of effective management is situated. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the tax residency of a person as per a double tax 
agreement is generally determined with reference to the domestic legislation of the 
countries involved. In a situation where a person is considered to be a tax resident in 
both of the two contracting states, one could refer to tie-breaker rules contained in 
Article 4 of the OECD Model Tax Convention in order to assign the residency to a 
particular state.  The tie-breaker rule in Article 4(3) with regardto legal persons is the 
test of ‘place of effective management’ which is describedas:81 
 
The place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the 
conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made. 
 
Application of the place of effective management test would generally effectively 
assign tax residency to one of the contracting states, unless the meaning of the term 
place of effective management is interpreted differently bythe two states involved. This 
difference in interpretation of the place of effective management tie-breaker rule could 
be problematic because a taxpayer could therefore effectivelybe a dual resident for 
bilateral tax treaty purposes and be subject to double taxation. One solution could be 
for such cases to be settled by competent authorities by virtue of mutual agreement, 
but this could still result in double taxation if an agreement cannot be reached. In 
addition to the place of effective management test being used as a tie-breaker in 
double tax agreements, it is also one of two tests in the South African tax legislation for 
determining a legal person’s tax residency in South Africa. The approach of SARS to 
the interpretation of the place of effective management is however not the same as the 
approach adopted by the OECD for purposes of double tax agreements.82The 
                                                     
81OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 4, para 24. 
82Pearson B, Gounden N, 2011, Tax News No. 3 of 2011, Place of Effective Management – Foreign 
entities to take heed of a recent court case, Deloitte 
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differences between the approaches of SARS and the OECD will be examined to 
illustrate an example of possible differing approaches.  
 
3.4.2 SARS’s current interpretation of place of effective management 
 
The term place of effective management is not defined in South African tax law and 
therefore guidance has been provided in Interpretation Note 6: Resident: Place of 
Effective Management (Persons other than Natural Persons) that was issued by SARS 
in March 2002.  South African tax courts83 have also only recently started interpreting 
the phrase.  The general approach taken by Interpretation Note 684 is that a company’s 
place of effective management is: 
 
‘the place where the company is managed on a regular or day-to-day basis by directors or 
senior managers of the company, irrespective of where the overriding control is exercised, or 
where the board of directors meet’ (emphasis added). 
 
The focus in Interpretation Note 6, and by direct implication that of SARS, is therefore 
on the actual location where policy and strategic decisions are executed and 
implemented by a company’s senior management, rather than the place where the 
ultimate authority over the company is exercised by its board of directors or similar 
body, i.e. where the decisions are made.85 
 
Interpretation Note 6 has been a cause for concern for taxpayers establishing offshore 
companies and trusts, as the views expressed by SARS appear to be much wider than 
the international view on this issue. This could deter investment into Africa using South 
Africa as a gateway and possibly have an effect on the economic growth of Africa as a 
whole. Furthermore, a foreign entity that is a tax resident in South Africa will be subject 
to tax in South Africa on its world-wide income.  If no relief is provided to this foreign 
entity by way of a double tax agreement with its country of incorporation due to a 
different interpretation of the place of effective management, the entity could face 
serious cash flow implications as a result of effectively being subject to double 
taxation. 
 
                                                     
83 For example, The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service, 13 June 2011, 74 SATC 127. 
84 South African Revenue Service, Interpretation Note 6: Resident: Place of Effective Management 
(Persons other than Natural Persons), March 2002, para 3.2. 
85South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011 
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Internationally there is broad consensus that the term ‘place of effective management 
has at least two main interpretations, namely the place where the board of directors 
meets or the place where the senior management operates.’86These interpretations 
are respectively labelled the ‘Anglo-American’, as followed by the OECD, and the 
‘Continental’ approach87, as followed by SARS in its current interpretation of the place 
of effective management. 
 
Regardless of the OECD’s interpretation of place of effective managementpossibly still 
presenting certain practical issues in today’s modernized global business environment, 
‘Interpretation Note 6 appears to have caused uncertainty in at least three ways: first, 
by adopting an approach that appears to conflict with the weight of international 
authority insofar as the general approach of Interpretation Note 6 focuses on the place 
where strategic decisions are ‘executed and implemented’88, rather than on the place 
where the decision-making, in substance, takes place; second, by appearing at times 
to blur the lines between what have been called the ‘second’ and ‘third’ levels of 
management; and third, by including certain factors in the ‘guideline’89 to determining 
place of effective management that appear to conflict with the general approach taken 
by Interpretation Note 6.’90 
 
3.4.3 Case Law 
 
In June 2011 a Mauritian company, The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd, submitted an 
application to the Western Cape High Court in its capacity as trustee of a Mauritian 
Trust.91  The company appealed to the court for an order declaring that the trust is not 
a South African taxpayer as it is not a South African tax resident and did not derive 
South African sourced income. Interestingly, in its ruling the court did not even 
consider Interpretation Note 6 as issued by SARS, but thought key features of a UK 
case, Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and 
                                                     
86 Russo M, European Tax 459 (2008). 
87South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011, page 5. 
88 South African Revenue Service, Interpretation Note 6: Resident: Place of Effective Management 
(Persons other than Natural Persons), March 2002, para 3.2. 
89 South African Revenue Service, Interpretation Note 6: Resident: Place of Effective Management 
(Persons other than Natural Persons), March 2002, para 3.4. 
90South African Revenue Service, Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6, Place of Effective 
Management, September 2011. 
91The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127 
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Another [2010] EWCA Civ 778,92 more relevant in determining the place of effective 
management of the Mauritian Trust. The applicant’s request for the declaratory order 
was dismissed93 based on the actual facts surrounding the trust’s management being 
unclear. The importance of this decision by the Court was however its 
acknowledgement94 that the place of effective management of a person other than a 
natural person is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are 
necessary for the conduct of a person’s business are in substance made.95 
The applicant placed reliance96 on the UK case, Commissioner for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and Another [2010] EWCA Civ 778,and 
specifically the following key features97 relating to the interpretation of place of 
effective management: 
 
• The place of effective management is the place where key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business 
are in substance made; 
• The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place where the most 
senior group of persons (e.g. a board of directors) makes its decision, where the 
actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are determined; 
• No definite rule can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances must be 
considered to determine the place of effective management of an entity; and 
• Although there may be more than one place of management, there may only be 
one place of effective management at any one time. 
 
This interpretation corresponds to that of the OECD Commentary and casts further 
doubt on SARS’s interpretation which focuses more on day to day management. 
 
                                                     
92The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127, pg. 131. 
93The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127, pg. 131. 
94The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127, pg. 131. 
95La Grange A, Tax Manager, Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, ‘case law guidance on effective 
management’, September 2011.] 
96The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127, pg. 130. 
97The Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd N.O v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 13 June 
2011, 74 SATC 127, pg. 131. 
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In another UK case, Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v 
Laerstate BV[2009] UKFIT 209 (TC), the First-Tier Tribunal observed that:98 
 
Where a company is managed by its directors in board meetings it will normally be where the 
board meetings are held. But if the management is carried out outside board meetings one 
needs to ask who was managing the company by making high level decisions and where, even 
where this is contrary to the company’s constitution. 
 
In this case it was established99 that the company was actually controlled and 
managed by its sole shareholder and not its sole director at the time. The Tribunal 
emphasized that ‘it is clear that the mere physical acts of signing resolutions or 
documents do not suffice for actual management.’  The Tribunal concluded100 that the 
shareholder’s activities were concerned with ‘policy, strategies and management 
matters’ and that his activities constituted the ‘real top management’ of the company 
which confirmed its POEM to be in the UK where the shareholder performed these 
activities.  
 
3.4.4 The OECD v SARS 
 
It could be argued that the OECD place of effective management test  is old fashioned 
and has not kept up with the pace of changes in telecommunications, international 
travel, modern business practices and general technology and the OECD has been 
under pressure to expand and develop this test.101  In some of South Africa’s tax 
treaties the tie breaker is actually not the place of effective management but mutual 
agreement by competent authorities of the two countries. Article 25 offor example 
South Africa’s treaties with China, Botswana, Nigeria and Turkey governs the mutual 
agreement procedures between South Africa and these countries. In the most recent 
treaties this test of mutual agreement has now been adopted as the tie-breaker rule 
due to difficulties in determining the place of effective management and due to the 
number of disputes SARS has had to deal with on the place of effective management 
test. Examples of these are the treaties between South Africa and China (2001), 
Belarus (2004) and Turkey (2006) respectively. The mutual agreement procedure is 
                                                     
98Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Laerstate BV [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC), 
para 25, page 33. 
99Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Laerstate BV [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC), 
para 25, page 39. 
100Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Laerstate BV [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC), 
para 25, page 39. 
101See for example, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Technical Advisory 
Group, Discussion Draft: Place of Effective Management Concept: Suggestions for Changes to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, 27 May 2003. 
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the OECD’s alternative proposed approach102 and a legal person’s place of effective 
management would be one of the factors taken into account in determining residence 
of the taxpayer.  
 
In the UK it has been stated that:103 
 
[W]e might ask whether concepts developed before the age of international telephone and 
even before the wireless telegraph . . . are still appropriate in today’s world. . . The contrast 
with the current availability of international communications by telephone, e-mail, videophone, 
video conferencing and the ubiquity of air travel is sharp. 
 
From a South African point of view, BA van der Merwe has expanded on these same 
issues:104 
 
The adequacy of effective management as a tie-breaker rule based upon [the location of 
superior management decision making] has been questioned. This interpretation of the phrase 
was coined when companies were generally organised in a hierarchical structure and 
management could be located at a specific point within a certain period of time. However, 
modern companies are increasingly run and managed divisionally rather than through the legal 
entities in which the divisions are formed. This has resulted in an organisational network 
spread across different countries. Also, due to modern technology, management has become 
much more mobile and traditional places of effective management may rotate. Technology has 
furthermore made it possible to manage without the need for a group of persons to be 
physically located or to meet in one place, for instance at the company’s headquarters. 
Because of these changed management structures and technology, effective management 
based on where the directors meet becomes a matter of choice and manipulation. Even when 
based on a wider interpretation of key management and decision making, it is evident that 
technology makes it difficult to pin effective management down to one constant location, and 
double or multiple residences or even non-residence may be the result. 
 
After a comprehensive process of investigating and analysing its Commentary on 
place of effective management, the OECD revised its Commentary in 2008 based on 
comments received on its discussion paper ‘Place of Effective Management Concept: 
Suggestions for Changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention’(2003 Discussion 
Paper). In particular, the revised Commentary105 omits any reference to an entity’s 
board of directors or similar body. The OECD noted that even the more expansive 
explanation put forward by its Technical Advisory Group ‘would not be in line with the 
views of the majority of its member countries as to the meaning of the concept of place 
of effective management.’106 In particular,  
 
                                                     
102OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Commentary to Article 4, para 24.1 
103  Miller A & Oates L, Principles of International Taxation, para 4.16 (Tottel Publishing Ltd: 2006).   
104 Van der Merwe BA, ‘The Phrase “place of effective management”: Effectively Explained?’, 18 
South African Mercantile Law Journal, 121 at p. 124-125 (2006).  
105 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing 
106 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, ‘Draft Contents of the 2008 Update to the Model 
Tax Convention’, at p. 7 (2008).   
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many countries . . . considered that the advisory group’s proposed interpretation gave undue 
priority to the place where the board of directors of a company would meet over the place 
where the senior executives of that company would make key management decisions. 
 
3.5 Closing Thoughts 
 
One approach to resolving dual-resident triangular caseswould be to include a specific 
provision in tax treaties to prevent dual resident persons from claiming treaty benefits under 
treaties concluded by RC1 (being the non-resident state in respect of the RC1-RC2 treaty) 
and SC,as discussed in the numerical analysis in chapter 3.2 above. The provision could 
deny treaty benefits with specific reference to the allocation of residence under treaties 
concluded with third states. The problem with this solution is that double tax agreements 
usually take a considerable amount of time with extensive negotiations to be concluded. 
Once implemented, such double tax agreements are often not renegotiated for quite a long 
time, and thus such a solution is not effective in the short term because of the length of time 
it will take for any existing treaty to be renegotiated to take into account such a provision. 
 
The author is therefore of the opinion that the difference in interpretation of the phrase place 
of effective management by SARS and the OECD Commentary could lead to international 
double taxation and that SARS should continue to further reconsider its interpretation so that 
it is even more aligned with international practices. 
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4 PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT TRIANGULAR CASES 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Permanent establishment triangular cases arise where a person who is a tax resident in one 
country has a permanent establishment in a second country and earns revenue that is 
attributable to that permanent establishment of which the source is in a third country.A 
permanent establishment triangular case can be graphically portrayed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All three the countries that are involved in a permanent establishment triangular case, RC, 
PEC and SC for purposes of discussion in chapter 4could potentially impose tax in 
accordance with the domestic legislation in each country or in terms of a double tax 
agreement. Please refer to Table 4.1 below for an analysis of this scenario.In the respective 
countries, tax will most likely be imposed in accordance with local tax legislationfor the 
following reasons: 
 
Residence country: Tax residency of the person earning the income, taxed 
on world-wide income107; 
Permanent establishment country: Business presence and activities of the taxpayer 
forming a link to the income earned, taxed on income 
attributable to the permanent establishment; and 
                                                     
107See for example, South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended), section 1, definition of 
‘gross income’, sub-paragraph (i). 
RC – SC Treaty Is there an applicable 
treaty? 
RC – PEC Treaty 
Source 
Country 
(‘SC’) 
Residence 
Country         
(‘RC’) 
PE 
 Country          
(‘PEC’) 
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Source country: Source basis of the income, taxed on income with a 
local source108. 
 
The OECD Report on triangular cases also describes the situation illustrated above as the 
so-called ‘typical triangular case’, specifically involving passive income (interest, royalties 
and dividends).109 
 
It could be said that the complexity of applying the relevant treaties that are involved in a 
triangular case is what actually creates the triangular tax effect. Normally, the bilateral tax 
treaty between RC and SC would apply if income is earned by a tax resident of RC with a 
source in SC.The conditions of the RC‐SC treaty will apply to the SC and it will generally be 
entitled to impose tax in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (specifically with regard 
to passive income).With regard to the profits of thepermanent establishment, the tax treaty 
between RC and PEC would apply, effectively assigning taxing rights to the PEC in 
accordance with Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (attribution of business 
profits)on the profit attributable to the permanent establishment.  
 
The important pointis however that the income earned by the taxpayer in the RC, has a 
source in a different country, SC, but is actually connected to the activities of the permanent 
establishment in yet another country, PEC, and not the business in the RC. For bilateral tax 
treaty purposes, the permanent establishment is to be treated as if it is a ‘distinct and 
separate enterprise’110 insofar as the attribution of business profits is concerned.The PEC, 
not being a party to a treaty with the SC, will not have any obligation to provide relief to the 
permanent establishment in respect of the tax imposed by the SC,but may have an 
obligation to do so under the permanent establishment non‐discrimination article111 of its 
treaty with the residence state (the RC‐PEC treaty). This obligation may arise in the event 
that the permanent establishment incurs an overall heavier tax burden than the tax residents 
of the PEC country would incur in a similar scenario.The RCwill be entitled to impose tax on 
the income (that is attributable to the PE and has a source in the SC) but will have an 
                                                     
108See for example, South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended), section 1, definition of 
‘gross income’, sub-paragraph (ii). 
109OECD, ‘Triangular Cases,’ in Model Tax Convention: Four Related Studies (Paris: OECD, 1992) 
110 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 7 para 2. 
111 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 24. 
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obligation to provide relief under both the RC-SC treaty112 and the RC-PEC treaty,113 which 
may not be sufficient to eliminate the triangular tax effect. 
 
A numerical analysis is done below in order to further illustrate the triangular effect in a 
permanent establishment triangular case: 
 
Example 3: 
 
Diagram:    Facts: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis: 
 
Country 
PEC 
(30% corp tax rate) 
SC 
(10% interest tax rate) 
RC 
(30% corp tax rate) 
Applicable treaty: RC-PEC treaty RC-SC treaty RC-PEC treaty 
Gross income 
amount: 
CUR 1 000  CUR 1 000  CUR 1 000  
Reason: 
Article 7 of the 
OECD Model Tax 
Article 11(2) of the OECD 
Model Tax 
Definition of gross 
income in RC (the 
                                                     
112 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 23. 
113 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 23. 
RC – PEC Treaty 
RC – SC  
Treaty 
RC PEC 
SC 
a)  TaxpayerZ, an investment bank, is a tax resident  
of RCand has a permanent establishment in       
     PEC by virtue of having a branch there; 
 
b)  The bank branch in PEC extended a loan to a     
      resident of a third country, SC; 
 
c) The resident of SC paid interest of CUR1 000 on    
     the loan amount to the branch in PEC; 
 
d)  The RC-SC treaty contains a 10% interest tax     
     rate applicable in SC; and 
 
e)The SC-PEC treaty does not apply because the  
permanent establishment is not a resident of the  
PEC. 
 
Note: 
 
RC:     The beneficial owner of the interest is a tax       
           resident in RC; 
PEC:   The loan was given to the recipient by the    
           permanent establishment in the PEC; and 
SC:     The interest was paid from SC (assumed to  
           be the source country for purposes of this    
example).  
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Convention (the 
interest is attributable 
to a loan that was 
given by the 
permanent 
establishment in the 
PEC). 
Article 11 is not 
applicable as the 
interest does not 
arise in PEC. 
Convention(the 
interestarose in and was 
paid from the SC). 
beneficial owner is a 
resident in RC). 
Relief provided: CUR 0 CUR 0 CUR 1 000 is exempt 
Reason: 
In terms of Article 7of 
the OECD Model Tax 
Convention the PEC 
is entitled to impose 
tax but has no 
obligation to provide 
relief. 
In terms of Article 11of the 
OECD Model Tax 
Convention the SC is 
entitled to impose tax at 
10% with no obligation to 
provide relief. 
Tax is not imposed in 
RC because of the 
implications of 
Articles 7 or 11 and 
23of the OECD 
Model Tax 
Convention. 
Tax incurred: CUR 300 CUR 100 CUR 0 
Total tax incurred: CUR 400 Effective double taxation 
 
 
It could be argued that the main problems surrounding permanent establishment triangular 
cases can be comprehensively attributed to the personalisation of the permanent 
establishment concept114. Three main sub-problems will be discussed below: 
 
4.2 Permanent establishmentspartially treated as residents 
 
In interpreting the provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the scope of the treaty 
and the following definitions are of importance (emphasis added): 
 
Scope:115 This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or 
both of the Contracting States. 
                                                     
114Martin Jimenez JA, Garcia Prats FA and José M, Carrero C, 'Triangular Cases, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law: The Saint-Gobain Decision of the ECJ' (2001) 55 Bulletin for International Taxation 473. 
115 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 1 
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Person:116 the term ‘person’ includes an individual, a company and any other 
body of persons; 
Resident:117 For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a 
Contracting State’ means any person who, under the laws of that 
State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, 
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, and 
also includes that State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof. This term, however, does not include any person who is liable 
to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in that State 
or capital situated therein. 
 
Also important to note is Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention regarding 
‘BusinessProfits’118 that states the following: 
 
 The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of 
the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to 
that permanent establishment.  
 
As mentioned previously in chapter 4.1, Article 7(2) of the OECD Model Tax 
Conventionfurther states that apermanent establishment should be treated as if it is a 
completely separate entity from the original enterprise in the resident state, insofar as the 
attribution of business profits is concerned. This leads one to conclude that any and all 
profits attributable to the permanent establishment, even if sourced in another state, should 
be taxed by the permanent establishment country. This is because there is noprovision in 
the OECD Model Tax Convention that stipulates an exception to Article 7 with regard to 
profits that are sourced from a third state. The provision simply allocates the taxing right of 
business profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment, to the country in which 
the permanent establishment is situated. The tax treatment of a permanent establishmentis 
thus in many aspects very similar to that of a company that is a tax resident in a particular 
state, that would consequently be taxed on a worldwide basis119as a resident of that state.  If 
the income that is attributable to the permanent establishment is sourced in a third country, 
                                                     
116 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 3, para 1(a) 
117 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 4, para 1 
118 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Article 7, para 1 
119Yong S, 'Triangular Treaty Cases: Putting Permanent Establishments in Their Proper Place' (2010) 
54 Bulletin for International Taxation 152, 155. 
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SC, and that country imposes tax on that income, then juridical double taxation occurs 
between the PEC and the SC.The question to ask is thus, is there a bilateral tax treaty 
between the SC and the PEC that could be appropriately applied in order to prevent the 
double taxation? 
 
As per the various existing bilateral tax treaties that could potentially be available to the 
respective parties in a permanent establishment triangular case, the SC must apply the 
provisions of the RC-SC treaty when imposing tax on income with a source in that country, 
and not the PEC-SC treaty.120Certain authors consider this to be the application of the 
incorrect treaty by the SC becausethe RC‐PEC treaty willmost likely assign the taxing right 
of the income to the PEC.121This view is based on the notion that, although the concept of a 
permanent establishment is presumably just a mechanism to determine whether source-
based taxation can be imposed in a particular country, it has the characteristics of a 
partial‐residence basis of taxation, as discussed in the following four paragraphs. 
 
As per the above extracts of the OECD Model Tax Convention in the introductory paragraph 
to chapter 4.2 (scope, person and resident), the treaty provisions are applicable only to 
persons who are a tax resident of at least one of the contracting states.  It is clear that the 
permanent establishment is not a person and therefore also not a resident of a contracting 
state. It can be argued that the concept of a permanent establishment122 is necessary only in 
a treaty context in order to determine the extent of the right of the source state (where the 
permanent establishment is situated) to tax the income of a non-resident company,  and thus 
essentially operates as a sourcing rule for treaty purposes. The result is therefore that a 
permanent establishment cannot take advantage of a double tax agreement between the 
source state and another state, i.e. is not entitled to treaty benefits because it is not a 
separate legal entity, a ‘person’ as defined, and can therefore not be a resident of a 
contracting state. 
                                                     
120 OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Articles 1, 3(1) and 4(1) 
121See, inter alia: Avery Jones, J.F., ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?’ 
53 Tax Law Review 1, (1999), pp. 1‐38;  Arnold, B.J. and Sasseville, J., Source Rules for Taxing 
Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (Toronto, 
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Intertax 8/9, (2007), pp. 473‐483. 
122OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 5 para 1. 
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From a legal perspective, there is a key difference between a permanent establishment and 
a subsidiary company.  In a tax treaty context, a permanent establishment can be described 
as simply being a foreign branch of a company that is a tax resident in another country, and 
in contrast to that, a subsidiary company is a separate legal entity and would usually be a 
corporate taxpayer by virtue of its incorporation in a particular country. This raises the 
question of whether this difference permits different treatment with respect to treaty eligibility. 
In general, there is a trend towards treating permanent establishments and subsidiaries in 
the same way on the basis that the economic substance of the two different forms of 
business is effectively the same.123  From a practical and substance-over-form perspective, 
the tax characterization of a situation is not always equal to the legal characterization and 
therefore the distinction between a permanent establishment and a subsidiary legal entity 
may be somewhat unclear and complicated. What is considered a permanent establishment 
under the domestic law of one state may be considered a separate taxable entity under the 
laws of another state and vice versa. For the purposes of determining the source of interest 
income, the payment of interest by a permanent establishment is generally treated as being 
equivalent to the payment of interest by a resident person.124 Furthermore, the OECD Model 
Tax Convention also provides for the taxation of a permanent establishment to be similar to 
that of a resident taxpayer in the permanent establishment non-discrimination article (Article 
24(3)), which requires the permanent establishment state to impose tax on the permanent 
establishment to the same extent as it would on a resident enterprise of that country.  
 
The above discussion highlights the hybrid nature of the permanent establishment concept.  
On the one hand, the permanent establishment concept seems to operate more as a 
sourcing rule in a treaty context seeing that the profits attributable to a permanent 
establishmentare taxed in the source country of its profits, but on the other hand it could be 
argued to be more of a residency rule seeing that that the permanent establishment is 
required by Article 7 to be taxed by the permanent establishment country in a similar way as 
it would tax a tax resident of that country. 
 
This hybrid nature of permanent establishments as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph,complicates matters in permanent establishment triangular cases where the 
income which is attributable to apermanent establishment and which the permanent 
establishment state is entitled to tax under the RC‐PEC treaty includes income which is 
                                                     
123Schön, W., ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I),’ 1 World Tax Journal 
1, (2009), 106. 
124Vann, R., Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm's-Length Principle, The Taxation of Business 
Profits Under Tax Treaties, (Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation) 2003, p 144.  
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sourced in a third state. The problem is the partial-resident treatment of permanent 
establishments whereby, just like a resident, the permanent establishment is taxed125 on its 
world-wide income but, unlike a resident, the permanent establishment has no 
corresponding entitlement to treaty benefits. It has no corresponding entitlement to treaty 
benefits because it cannot be a person covered by a tax treaty as explained above in the 
sixth paragraph of chapter 4.2 and is therefore unable to rely on relief provided by the 
provisions of the treaty.The consequence of this is that the PEC has no direct obligation to 
grant relief to the permanent establishment for tax imposed in the SC (apart from the 
application of the non‐discrimination principles) and the SC has no obligation to apply the 
conditions of the SC-PEC treaty because the permanent establishment is not a resident of a 
contracting state to said treaty and is therefore not entitled to treaty benefits. Thus, difficulty 
can arise with regard to the application of bilateral treaties in permanent establishment 
triangular cases because, for treaty purposes, permanent establishments are treated 
partially like residents of the permanent establishment state, i.e. only to the extent of profit 
attribution, and not to the extent of being entitled to corresponding treaty benefits. 
 
4.3 Simultaneous application of two bilateral tax treaties 
 
As mentioned before in chapter 4.1, the residence country in a permanent establishment 
triangular case will be a contracting state to two bilateral tax treaties being applied 
simultaneously, the RC-SC treaty as well as the RC-PEC treaty. Consequently, the RC may 
have an obligation to provide relief for tax imposed in both the SC and the PEC on the same 
taxable income. This situation gives rise to two main concerns.126 
 
Considering that source-based taxation may be imposed in both the SC and the PEC, and 
residence-based taxation will be imposed in the RC, the issue is not whether the RC will be 
able to provide relief, but whether it will be able to provide sufficient relief to prevent 
unrelieved triangular taxation.    
 
It can be said that unrelieved double taxation should only occur in triangular cases if the 
overall tax burden imposed on one person is more than the highest of the applicable tax 
                                                     
125OECD (2012) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (updated 2010) OECD Publishing, 
Art 7. 
126See, inter alia: OECD, ‘Triangular Cases,’ in Model Tax Convention: Four Related Studies (Paris: 
OECD, 1992); Van Raad, K. ‘The 1992 OECD Model Treaty: Triangular Cases,’ 33 European 
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‘Triangular Cases Involving Income Attributable to PEs’. 53 Tax Notes International 12 (2009), pp. 
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rates in each of the three countries that seek to impose tax on the income.127It follows then 
that the residence state should be able to extend sufficient double taxation relief (by way of 
the credit method)128in permanent establishment triangular caseswhere the combined 
effective tax rate in the two source states is lower than the applicable tax rate in the 
residence state.129 
 
The second concern is the RC's potential obligation to provide dual relief as is required in 
terms of both the applicable treaties. For example, if the RC-PEC treaty requires the RC to 
exempt the income arising in a permanent establishment triangular case and the RC-SC 
treaty requires the RC to grant relief using the credit method, the RC will only be able to 
meet its treaty obligations by allowing both relief measures.The OECD Model Tax 
Conventionlimits the amount of credit relief in the residence state to the amount of tax 
imposed by this state which is attributable to the income.130 If the exemption under one 
treaty is taken into account for purposes of applying the other bilateral treaty, no credit relief 
should be available because there would be no tax attributable to the income in the 
residence state.131As a result of the exemption, the prerequisite requirement for granting a 
credit (i.e. that tax was imposed on the income in the RC) is factually not met. The RC 
should therefore not be in a position where dual relief is required in terms of both the RC-SC 
treaty and the RC-PEC treaty.  
 
4.4 Source of the Income 
 
Another contributing factor to problems arising in permanent establishment triangular cases 
is an overlap of the ‘source’ principle as contained in the relevant bilateral tax treaties 
involved.132 For purposes of the RC‐SC treaty, the income generally arises and is effectively 
                                                     
127Langoth B, Treaty Entitlement of Permanent Establishments, Triangular Tax Cases, edited by 
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Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation10, (2005), pp. 420‐423. 
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sourced in the SC and, depending on the type of income, theSC may be entitled to impose 
tax on that income. For purposes of the RC‐PEC treaty, the income which is attributable to 
the permanent establishment is effectively considered to be sourced in the PECfor 
application of that treaty. This overlap in the source rules can create conflict in permanent 
establishment triangular cases because both the SC and the PEC may have a legitimate 
claim to impose source-based taxation on the income earned. The question to ask is 
therefore should one of the source states, either SC or PEC, be prevented from imposing tax 
on the relevant income stream? 
 
Whilst the apparent answer appears to be yes, one country should be prevented from 
imposing tax in order to prevent unrelieved double taxation to the taxpayer in the SC and the 
PEC, the problem is which country? The income concerned has a lawful economic 
connection to both the SC and the PEC and thus, both countries arguably have a valid 
taxing claim in relation to the income. If one country’s taxing rights are to be denied entirely, 
the fiscus of one of the two states will effectively incur a financial loss, and it is doubtful that 
states would be willing to settlefor such an agreement.  If the PEC is prevented from taxing 
the income attributable to a non-resident’s permanent establishment that was derived from 
sources in a third state, it would undermine the residence‐supporting role of the permanent 
establishment concept in tax treaties133 and give rise to significant tax avoidance concerns 
(effectively being an incentive to‘replace’ residence entities with permanent establishment 
entities). Alternatively, if the source state were to be prevented from imposing tax on income 
derived in permanent establishment triangular cases, it is submitted that all source-based 
taxation could be avoided by simply operating through a permanent establishment in a third 
country, and thus yet again result in significant tax avoidance opportunities. An acceptable 
solution would thus be that neither country should be required to completely surrender its 
taxing rights, but that effective measures should be put in place to ensure the prevention of 
double-taxation as well as tax avoidance.   
 
  
                                                     
133Vann, R., Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm's-Length Principle, The Taxation of Business 
Profits Under Tax Treaties, (Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation) 2003, p 147. 
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5 COMPATIBILITY OF TREATIES WITH CURRENT SOLUTIONS 
 
Existing proposals by the OECD and, where applicable, tax authors, for solving triangular 
cases will be evaluated in terms of their compatibility with bilateral treaties.  It has been 
observed that the bilateral nature of tax treaties is the reason why triangular cases are 
created.134Dual resident triangular cases as well as permanent establishment triangular 
cases, together with particular issues of bilateral tax treaty applicability to these cases, were 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The solutions that have been suggested to solve 
triangular cases with the aim to find out whether these solutions are compatible with the 
bilateral nature of tax treaties and whether a single bilateral treaty is able to provide for an 
efficient solution, are discussed in this chapter. This chapter is not meant to present a new 
solution, but to assess the proposed solutions from the perspective of the bilateral nature of 
the tax treaties. 
 
5.1 Dual ResidentTriangular Cases 
 
5.1.1 Simultaneous application of two bilateral tax treaties 
 
The OECD attempted to solve dual resident triangular cases by way of supplementary 
provisions in bilateral tax treaties. One such solution meant to solve double taxation in 
a triangular situation is the inclusion of a tie-breaker rule in a bilateral tax treaty that 
would determine which tax treaty is applicable.135Based on a Dutch case (28 February 
2001, BNB 2001/295) where the tax authorities wanted to prevent the favourable 
arrangements of Dutch resident companies transferring their residence to other states 
while still taking advantage of the Dutch treaty network,136 the second sentence of 
Article 4(1) could apparently be seen as such a rule because a resident of a 
contracting state, who is the person who usually has a full tax liability in that state, 
cannot be considered to have the status of resident if he is taxed only on a source 
basis (i.e. limited tax liability). This would then also restrict the person from being seen 
as a resident of a contracting state for the purposes of any other tax treaty. This 
understanding of the second sentence of Article 4(1) has been widely 
                                                     
134Sasseville J, 'The Role of Tax Treaties in the 21th Century' (2002) 56 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 246, 247. 
135OECD 'Triangular Cases' Model Tax Convention: Four Related Studies (Paris, OECD, 1992), para 
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criticised137because the first sentence of Article 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention specifically states that the term 'resident of a contracting state' is defined 
for the 'purposes of thisConvention' and therefore it cannot be applicable for the 
purposes of any other bilateral tax treaty.  
 
Another question to consider138 when determining whether the second sentence of 
Article 4(1) excludes dual‐residents from treaty eligibility, is whether the RC1-RC2 
treaty implications regarding tax imposed in RC1 should at all be taken into account, or 
whether consideration should be limited to the tax imposed under the domestic 
legislation of that state, RC1. The appropriate interpretation seems to be that the 
second sentence of Article 4(1) refers only to domestic law.139 Consequently the dual 
resident would still be a resident of the ‘non-resident’ state for the purposes of bilateral 
tax treaties concluded between that state and other third states. 
 
Avery Jones points out that the dual residence problem is best solved by domestic law 
provisions that could provide that if a resident of a state loses its residence status 
under one tax treaty, then it is also lost for domestic law purposes as well as for the 
purposes of other bilateral tax treaties with that state.140 
 
Garcia Prats views the dual resident triangular case in the same light as the typical 
permanent establishment triangular case. The difference between the two situations is 
that a permanent establishment can never be a resident of the state where it is 
located, whereas the person that is a dual resident is still considered to be a resident 
under domestic laws of both of the two contracting states. He therefore agrees that 
domestic law should have the provision that changes the residence status under the 
domestic law in order to prevent the tax treaty access for the non-resident.141 
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Even if tax treaties contain tie-breaker rules that are designed to solve the conflict of 
rules between the two contracting states, it is submitted that they do not affect any 
other treaties in accordance with the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ principle in Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In terms of the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ 
principle only the two contracting states to a treaty can rely on the provisions of the 
treaty to be adhered to in good faith, no other party has access to this assurance.  In 
order for the problem of two bilateral tax treaties being applied simultaneously to be 
solved, there has to be another explicit provision that could exclude the applicability of 
one of the treaties. Generally international treaties do not have any order of priority 
with regard to application142 and one bilateral treaty cannot exclude the application of 
another. Thus, a specific tie-breaker rule143 or a separate supplementary provision is 
necessary to be included either in domestic legislation or as part of the provisions of 
bilateral tax treaties to prevent the simultaneous application of two bilateral treaties.  
 
It is interesting to note that the inverse of the dual resident triangular case as 
discussed in this report, a dual source triangular case (which falls outside of the 
general scope of this report and was therefore not examined), has also been 
addressed by the OECD by the inclusion of Article 11(5) in the OECD Model Tax 
Convention that reads as follows:144 
 
Interest shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State when the payer is a resident of that 
State. Where, however, the person paying the interest, whether he is a resident of a 
Contracting State or not, has in a Contracting State a permanent establishment in connection 
with which the indebtedness on which the interest is paid was incurred, and such interest is 
borne by such permanent establishment, then such interest shall be deemed to arise in the 
State in which the permanent establishment is situated. 
 
5.2 Permanent Establishment Triangular Cases 
 
5.2.1 Proposed solutions by tax authors 
 
Tax authors have proposed solutions to permanent establishment triangular cases 
specifically with regard to the bilateral nature of tax treaties.  
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144Gusmeroli M, 'Triangular Cases and the Interest and Royalties Directive: Untying the Gordian 
Knot? - Part 1' (2005) 45 European Taxation 2, 23. 
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One of these suggestions was made by Avery Jones and Bobbett. They proposed that 
the SC-PEC bilateral tax treaty include a specific provision which states that this treaty 
should apply with regard to income derived from the SC that is attributable to a 
permanent establishment.  They explained that the alternative, i.e. the RC-SC treaty 
not applying, would be more complicated seeing that different bilateral tax treaties do 
not have the power to affect the applicability of each other.145 It could be argued 
though that this solution of including a specific provision in the SC-PEC treaty, 
assuming that one exists, is contrary to the relative effect of tax treaties since it 
attempts to create an obligation, although reciprocal, for contracting states to grant the 
benefits of their bilateral treaty to a resident of a third state that was not party to the 
treaty-making process. Nevertheless, explicit consent is not required for granting rights 
to third countries (refer 2.3.1) and it depends solely on the generosity of the bilateral 
treaty partners, however unlikely the possibility might seem.  
 
This path was further explored by Zhai who attempted to take into account this exact 
issue of the relative effect of tax treaties.146 He proposed that a supplementary 
provision be included in one of the treaties of which the RC is a contracting state, the 
RC-SC treaty. This supplementary provision should place an obligation on the SC to 
apply the other bilateral treaty which it has concluded with the PEC.147 It would appear 
that this solution is the most appropriate to solve permanent establishment triangular 
situations while still keeping the overall bilateral nature of tax treaties. As Zhai 
mentioned, by changing the extent to which the obligations to contracting states in a 
bilateral tax treaty can be applied, thebilateral obligations are honoured without 
granting the permanent establishments any treaty benefits.148 Therefore, both tax 
treaties that RC and SC have concluded with the PEC should provide that the income 
attributable to a permanent establishment is treated as if it was derived by a resident of 
the PEC. It would seem that this solution is closely related to how a permanent 
establishment is currently being treated in terms of the RC-PEC treaty (with regard to 
the attribution of business profits), except that the possibility of double taxation within a 
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permanent establishment triangular case is mitigated by the inclusion of similar 
permanent establishment provisions in the SC-PEC treaty as is currently in the RC-
PEC treaty. There are however two important prerequisites for this solution to 
effectively prevent triangular cases and those are firstly that both RC and SC have tax 
treaties with the PEC, and secondly that the treaties contain the non-discrimination 
provision that will prevent unrelieved double taxation as a result of discrimination 
against the permanent establishment based on nationality.149 
 
If such supplementary provisions, as suggested by Zhai,were not present in treaties, it 
would be difficult to treat the permanent establishment as a resident with respect to the 
income attributable to it by both treaty partners. This was illustrated by the Hana 
Semiconductor case150 in which a resident taxpayer of Thailand had received a loan 
from a branch of a foreign bank and paid interest to this branch. The branch was 
located in Singapore and represented a permanent establishment in Singapore of the 
foreign bank.The relevant parties in this permanent establishment triangular case are 
as follows: 
 
Thailand:   SC (country where the interest was paid from); 
Singapore:  PEC (country where the permanent establishment is 
situated); and 
Foreign country:  RC (country of the bank’s head office).  
 
The Thai Supreme Court, in the SC, refused to grant tax treaty benefits to the 
permanent establishment, the bank branch that was situated in Singapore, because 
the branch was not a resident liable to tax in Singapore for purposes of the tax treaty 
between Thailand and Singapore, the SC-PEC treaty. The court in this case 
demonstrated the general extent of the application and impact of bilateral tax treaties 
(that is to residents of the two contracting states only) in a permanent establishment 
triangular tax case, specifically with regard to the difficulty of extending bilateral tax 
treaty benefits to permanent establishments that are situated in third states.  
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Despite the non-discrimination Article 24(3), the SC has no reason to treat the 
permanent establishment similarly to the residents of the other contracting state, PEC. 
This is because the permanent establishment is not situated in the SC and therefore 
Article 24(3) does not apply to the permanent establishment and the SC. 
 
It is therefore clear that Zhai’s proposal to include an additional provision in both of the 
bilateral tax treatiesto which the SC is a contracting state (in the RC-SC treaty to 
compel the SC to apply its treaty with the PEC, and in the SC-PEC treaty to provide for 
income attributable to a permanent establishment as if it was derived by aresident of 
the PEC), contributes towards more equal treatment of the permanent establishment 
with regard to treaty benefits entitlement. At the same time, the inclusion of such 
provisions does not grant the permanent establishment full access to resident status 
and thus tax treaties, and neither does it conflict with the bilateral nature of tax treaties. 
 
5.2.2 The OECD’s Solution to Permanent Establishment Triangular Cases 
 
Member countries of the OECD realised early on that triangular cases are possible in 
the context of bilateral tax treaties.151  The conclusion at the time was that it was too 
difficult to deal with such situations in the OECD Model Tax Convention or its 
Commentary and the member countries were advised to search for a solution in their 
bilateral tax treaties.152 Some 30 years later the OECD compiled a report called 
‘Triangular Cases’ which led to amendments being made to the Commentary that were 
adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992 (first published in 2000). The wording 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention did not change at the time and that Commentary 
has remained basically unchanged since 1992. 
 
To the extent that the PEC imposes tax on income arising in a permanent 
establishment triangular case, it should be obliged to grant relief for tax imposed in the 
SC, both to ensure that double taxation can be prevented and to ensure a fair 
distribution of taxing revenues between the PEC and the RC. 
 
Paragraph 67 of the OECD Commentary to Article 24 reads as follows: 
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In a related context, when foreign income is included in the profits attributable to a permanent 
establishment, it is right by virtue of the same principle to grant to the permanent establishment 
credit for foreign tax borne by such income when such credit is granted to resident enterprises 
under domestic laws. 
 
The OECD’s current recommendation to solve a typical permanent establishment 
triangular case is thus based on Article 24(3) which requires that a permanent 
establishment could not be treated less favourably than aresident of the contracting 
state where the permanent establishment is situated. It therefore recommends that 
treaty benefits, i.e. the granting of a tax credit, be extended to permanent 
establishmentseven though a permanent establishment is not normallyentitled to treaty 
benefits of the state where it is situated.153 
 
The Commentary further states that ‘the majority of Member countries are able to grant 
credit in these cases on the basis of their domestic law or under paragraph 3’ which is 
the non-discrimination provision of tax treaties.  States that are not able to extend such 
relief may include a supplementary provision in their bilateral tax treaties providing for 
the granting of the tax credit.154  This suggested supplementary provision reads as 
follows: 
 
When a permanent establishment in a Contracting State of an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State receives dividends or interest from a third State and the holding or debt-claim 
in respect of which the dividends or interest are paid is effectively connected with that 
permanent establishment, the first-mentioned State shall grant a tax credit in respect of the tax 
paid in the third State on the dividends or interest, as the case may be, by applying the rate of 
tax provided in the convention with respect to taxes on income and capital between the State of 
which the enterprise is a resident and the third State. However, the amount of the credit shall 
not exceed the amount that an enterprise that is a resident of the first mentioned State can 
claim under that State’s convention on income and capital with the third State.155 
 
Even though the current solution is viable, it would depend on the contracting states 
actually negotiating to include it in their treaties. 
 
It is interesting to note that Article 24(3) is more general in nature by requiring only that 
the permanent establishment should not be treated less favourably than a resident of 
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that state. It does not prescribe any other conditions such as credit or exemption 
method being used, domestic law or the tax treaty relief being applied. The 
Commentary confirms that it is the result alone that counts, that it should not be more 
burdensome for the permanent establishment compared to the resident enterprise in 
carrying on similar activities.156 In contrast to this general approach, the Commentary 
explicitly recommends the credit method being applied to the taxation of profits of the 
permanent establishment.157  In addition to the credit method being prescribed, it also 
sets the conditions that the relief should be subjected to the provisions of the RC-SC 
tax treaty and the amount of credit is limited to the amount that the residents of  the 
permanent establishment state would normally receive (refer above for the suggested 
supplementary provision).  
 
Vogel pointed out158 that the Supreme Court of the Netherlands159 gave a ruling in the 
‘Japanese royalties’ case that seems to be in line with the OECD’s solution. A tax 
resident of the Netherlands had a permanent establishment in Switzerland and 
received royalties from Japan. 
 
The relevant parties in this case were: 
 
Netherlands:   RC (resident country of the taxpayer); 
Switzerland:   PEC (permanent establishment country); and 
Japan:    SC (country from which the royalties originated). 
 
The royalties paid by Japan, the SC, were split 90% to the Switzerland permanent 
establishment and 10% to the head-office in the Netherlands. The royalties were 
subject to withholding tax in terms of the Switzerland-Japan tax treaty160, and the 
profits of the Swiss permanent establishment were deemed to be exempt in the 
Netherlands in terms of the Switzerland-Netherlands tax treaty. In the Netherlands, the 
taxpayer claimed a tax exemption with regard to all profits attributable to the 
permanent establishment, including the 90% royalties received from Japan, under the 
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Netherlands-Switzerland tax treaty, and a full tax credit under the Netherlands-
Japanese tax treaty. The Netherlands tax authorities allowed only 10% of the credit 
with regard to the royalties seeing that only 10% of the royalties were attributable to 
the head office and subject to tax in the Netherlands. The Supreme Court supported 
this decision and stated that the purpose of the tax treaty credit rules was to ensure 
that the credit would not exceed the taxes that were attributable to the 
Netherlands.161Contrary to the OECD’s recommendation, the Switzerland tax 
authorities did not grant a tax credit relating to the withholding tax paid on the 90% 
royalties in Japan to the permanent establishment and thus the situation still resulted 
in juridical double taxation for the taxpayer seeing that the royalties attributable to the 
permanent establishment were taxed in Japan via withholding tax, and again in 
Switzerland as part of the permanent establishment’s business profits.162 
 
In another Supreme Court of the Netherlands’ case,163 a Netherlands tax resident had 
a permanent establishment in Belgium and derived income from Brazil and Italy. With 
reference to the 'Japanese royalties' case, the court confirmed its previous viewpoint 
that atax credit for taxes paid in another jurisdiction (like for example withholding tax 
on royalties) cannot be granted to the taxpayer since the profits of the permanent 
establishmentwere not subject to tax by the Netherlands revenue authority. 
Furthermore, the court also established that the permanent establishment in Belgium 
was entitled to a tax credit under both tax treaties with the third states from which the 
income originated, i.e. the treaty between Belgium and Brazil, as well as the treaty 
between Belgium and Italy. Even though it is clear that it cannot be presumed that 
permanent establishments are normally entitled to treaty benefits in their state of 
location164 (as in the Japanese royalties case), Belgium granted tax credits for 
withholding taxes paid in other countries on income derived by the taxpayer from those 
countries and double taxation was thus prevented.165 
 
From the latter case mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that the OECD 
solution is sometimes accepted internationally for example, by Belgium, and that the 
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permanent establishment treaty partner is expected to apply the non-discrimination 
article and allow access to its tax treaty network with third states. The court’s decision 
appears to be reasonable since it prevented the double taxation that the taxpayer 
might otherwise have incurred, but, because the court preferred the purposive 
interpretation instead of the actual wording of the tax treaty, they have also been 
criticised for not actually following the rules of treaty interpretation as per the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.166 
 
5.2.3 Personalisation of the Permanent Establishment Concept 
 
As mentioned in the closing paragraph of chapter 4.1, the main contributing factor to 
the occurrence of triangular cases is the personalisation of the permanent 
establishment concept.167 Although a permanent establishment is not a separate legal 
entity, it is treated similarly from an international taxation point of view in order to 
determine the right of a contracting state to tax the profits of the enterprise of the other 
contracting state.168 
 
Permanent establishments are effectively taxed on their worldwide income by virtue of 
Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention whereby the income attributable to the 
permanent establishment it is submitted includes not only income from the state of its 
location, but also includes income from third states169 (it includes all income 
attributable to the permanent establishment). Article 21(2) also confirms that a right to 
tax is given to the contracting state where the permanent establishment is situated, 
and it is submitted that that right includes the right to tax income from third states. This 
interpretation is based on income from third states not specifically being excluded 
anywhere in the OECD Model Tax Convention from this income that is attributable to 
the permanent establishment and subject to tax in the PEC. It is thus clear that if the 
domestic legislation of the PEC utilises its right to tax income from third states as part 
of the income attributable to a permanent establishment situated therein, the OECD 
approach as stipulated in Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention with regard 
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tothe taxing of a permanent establishment, serves as a confirmation of the worldwide 
taxation basis. 
 
Usually the obligation to grant relief corresponds with the right to tax income on a 
worldwide basis. If this was not the case, juridical double taxation would occur. The 
OECD Model Tax Convention relief provisions, however, only deal with the relief that 
must be extended to the residents of the contracting state that receive income from the 
other contracting state and not with the relief that must possibly be extended 
topermanent establishments situated in another state.170  It therefore seems 
reasonable to question the traditional bilateral functioning of tax treaties.171 If one of 
the contracting states is given the right to tax the worldwide income of the permanent 
establishment (assuming the income is in fact attributable to the permanent 
establishment), should that state not also be the state that is obliged to ensure that the 
income from the third state is not subject to double taxation? Paragraph 70 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary to Article 24 seems to take cognisance of 
the limited personal scope of tax treaties (Article 1) and suggests that the contracting 
states solve these situations in their bilateral tax treaties by adding supplementary 
provisions or by applying their domestic legislation.172 
 
Hattingh concluded that Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention was not meant 
to be a guiding principle of tax treaties, but rather a consequence of the limited scope 
of the other provisions contained in tax treaties.173 Previous versions of tax treaties did 
not contain such an article and seemed to function without it,174 but he is of the opinion 
that the inclusion of this article was a confirmation of the bilateral nature of tax 
treaties,175 as well as exactly who the tax treaty benefits are applicable to.176 If it is 
considered that Article 1 seeks to extend treaty benefits only to those that are 
sufficiently connected to a particular contracting state to claim the benefits of tax 
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treaties concluded by this state, then it would appear reasonable to argue that a 
permanent establishment has equally a close connection to the state where it is 
situated. This close connection seems to be illustrated in a number of ways, such as 
the right to tax the non-resident enterprise being given to the state where the 
permanent establishment is situated, and the separate entity approach for 
determination of the attributable profits of a permanent establishment.177 
 
It would thus appear that the OECD attempts to prohibit discrimination against 
permanent establishments, but at the same time does not explicitly guarantee that 
permanent establishments will be treated equally to residents of contracting states and 
not be subject to double taxation since the actual implementation of the equal 
treatment is left to the discretion of the contracting states.Allowing permanent 
establishments to claim treaty benefits would be a logical extension of the separate 
enterprise approach and would represent the next step in the on-going process of 
personalisation of permanent establishments. 
 
5.2.4 Tax treaty entitlement for the permanent establishment 
 
Another point of discussion regarding the extension of tax treaty relief measures to a 
permanent establishment, is specifically around the question of whether full access to 
the tax treaty network of the state where it is situated should be granted to the 
permanent establishment, or if the extent of relief should be capped at what is 
necessary to solve a triangular tax case.  
 
Thus far the main argument against extending the full tax treaty entitlement to a 
permanent establishment is the limited scope of application of tax treaties by way of 
Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.178 
 
The current wording of Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention explicitly includes 
only persons and residents of the contracting states in its scope. As discussed before 
in chapter 4.2, a permanent establishment clearly falls out of this scope (by virtue of it 
not being a person or a tax resident as defined), and can therefore, strictly speaking, 
not be entitled to treaty benefits without the inclusion of supplementary provisions in 
that respect in a tax treaty. Alternatively, in order to include a permanent 
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establishmentin the scope of tax treaties, either the actual wording of Article 1 should 
be amended to specifically include permanent establishments in the scope of a treaty, 
or the interpretation of the meaning of Article 1 (in the Commentary to Article 1 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention) should be amended to include permanent 
establishments.   
 
Another argument against extending treaty entitlement to permanent establishments is 
the relative effect of international treaties.179 One could ask, is it appropriate for a 
bilateral tax treaty, as negotiated between two states, to regulate either of the 
contracting states’ relations with a third state?  The OECD Report on triangular cases 
stated that the treaty between the state of source and the state where the permanent 
establishment is situated could only be applied if it expressly provided for treatment of 
triangular cases.180 
 
Garcia Prats concluded that the contracting states should not limit the scope of 
application of the non-discrimination article in a treaty between them (RC-SC) by 
referring to the limited scope of the other tax treaty that is relevant within a triangular 
case (SC-PEC), seeing that states would therefore be able to 'overrule their 
international obligations by invoking the relative effect of other treaties'.181 
 
Granting full treaty access to a permanent establishment in the state where it is 
situated appears to be the appropriate way in order to treat permanent establishments 
equally with residents in most aspects. 
 
One of the primary concerns that arise in relation to permanent establishment 
triangular cases is the potential for improper claims for treaty benefits by virtue of 
treaty shopping. This is as a result of the source state potentially being required to 
reduce the amount of tax it imposes on income based on the application of the RC‐SC 
treaty and where the RC is prevented from taxing the income (in accordance with the 
RC-PEC treaty).182The OECD acknowledges that permanent establishments could be 
used to take advantage of the favourable tax regime of the country of its location and 
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suggests again its solution of a bilateral or unilateral approach.183  Authors such as 
Garcia Prats have argued that the treaty-shopping concern is weak because resident 
enterprises, such as subsidiaries, could equally make use and take advantage of the 
treaty network.184 
 
Granting resident status to permanent establishments would certainly address both the 
issue of equal tax treatment as well as full access to tax treaty benefits. If this were to 
be done, it would however mean that either the concept of permanent establishment or 
the concept of residence in tax treaties would need to change. Yong suggests185 a 
more flexible approach whereby permanent establishments are granted resident status 
only conditionally in situations where the state where the permanent establishment is 
situated actually subjects the permanent establishment to worldwide taxation on profits 
attributable to it. It would also not be necessary to grant resident status for purposes of 
all the tax treaties involved in the triangular situation, such as for purposes of the 
bilateral tax treaty with the state of its head-office.186 
 
However, when the OECD examined the proposal to treat the permanent 
establishment in the state where it is situated as a resident of that state, the large 
majority of the OECD Member states did not support that solution because it would 
depart too much from the principles and current practices of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention.187 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The essence of a triangular situation seems to be most adequately described as 'a situation 
in which a multilateral tax claim leads to triple taxation, at least, on the same subject and 
income'188. The objective of the research report was to investigate the ability of a single 
bilateral tax treaty (using the OECD Model Tax Convention) to solve triangular cases. 
 
For ease of reference, the two types of triangular cases that were discussed in this report 
are illustrated again below: 
 
Dual resident triangular cases:Permanent establishment triangular cases: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research report investigated the various underlying causes and contributing factors of 
specific types of triangular cases and based on this evaluation, has identified four common 
characteristicsof such cases in Chapter 2 in order to assess the compatibility of current 
suggested solutions with the bilateral nature of tax treaties.  
 
These common features of triangular cases are: i) they usually involve more than two 
connecting factors such as three different countries, ii) multiple layers of taxation are 
involved by virtue of threedifferent tax jurisdictions wanting to impose tax on the same 
income stream, iii) they usually result in a treaty conflict because more than onebilateral tax 
treaty could simultaneously be applicable, and iv) the solution would appear to usually 
involve some degree of ‘generosity’ by one of the applicable states.  
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Of specific interest to this research report is the third characteristic of bilateral treaties, which 
effectively results from the failure of such treaties to take into account the application of other 
bilateral treaties with regard to matters such as the assignment of taxing rights and allocation 
of residence.  
 
The OECD also makes reference in the Commentary to Article 24, paragraph 71, to 
situations where the opposite of unrelieved triangular taxation could occur, i.e. double non-
taxation, which reads as follows: 
 
 If the Contracting State of which the enterprise is a resident exempts from tax the profits of the 
permanent establishment located in the other Contracting State, there is a danger that the enterprise will 
transfer assets such as shares, bonds or patents to permanent establishments in States that offer very 
favourable tax treatment, and in certain circumstances the resulting income may not be taxed in any of 
the three States.189 
 
Double non-taxation has not been discussed in this report and the situation is probably not a 
direct consequence of triangular cases, but it is worth mentioning that it could also occur in 
triangular cases due to the tax avoidance practices of taxpayers.  
 
An examination was performed in Chapter 5 of the current existing solutions to triangular 
cases, as proposed by the OECD and tax authors, in order to establish theircompatibility 
with the bilateral nature of tax treaties. The overall conclusion as discussed in chapters 5.1 
and 5.2 isthat one bilateral tax treaty will usually not be sufficient to solve the tax treaty 
applicability issues and the relevant solution would require at least two different treaties to 
effectively resolve a triangular case. 
 
In permanent establishment triangular cases, problems arise in triangular cases due to the 
overlap of the implicit sourcing rules in treaties, as discussed in chapter 4.4. The sourcing of 
income in a particular state under a bilateral tax treaty has no impact on where the income is 
considered to be sourced for the purposes of other bilateral treaties, and currently there is no 
mechanism to resolve this overlap. The apparent solution as discussed in chapter 4.4, would 
thus be to resolve the overlap of sourcing rules, but regard must be given to the risk of tax 
avoidance by taxpayers in contracting states.It is submitted that a possible solution to this 
problem of overlapping source rules, particularly with reference to income attributable to a 
permanent establishment, is to include as part of the OECD Model Tax Convention specific 
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and more direct guidance as to the true source of different income types that could be 
utilized during the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral tax conventions. This would probably 
mean that certain states will have to give up their taxing rights if the source is determined to 
be in another state, which could prove detrimental to the conclusion of such said 
conventions. It is further submitted than an alternative could then be to assign a primary and 
secondary source to particular income streams and assign taxing rights accordingly. For 
example, if two states cannot agree on one particular source for the income, say interest that 
is normally taxed at 10%, the specific and direct guidance as mentioned could be utilized to 
assign for argument’s sake a 6% tax rate to the state of the primary source and a 4% tax 
rate to the source of the secondary source.  That way the overall tax rate is still 10%, the 
taxpayer would not be negatively impacted and both states would receive tax income. 
 
Another complicating factor relating specifically topermanent establishment triangular cases 
is the hybrid nature and personalisation of the permanent establishment concept as 
discussed in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. A permanent establishment is generally a source concept 
that is treated very similarly to a resident of a contracting state, specifically with regard to the 
application of bilateral tax treaties. What is concerning about this application is that the 
permanent establishment is only partiallytreated like a resident, i.e. the state in which the 
permanent establishment is situated is granted the right to tax the permanent establishment 
on its world-wide income190, but does not have an equal obligation to extend relief for taxes 
paid by the taxpayer on income that is attributable to the permanent establishment in 
another state. This is because the permanent establishment is not a resident of a contracting 
state as defined in Article 3 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and is therefore not a 
person covered by the treaty between the SC and the PEC (as per Article 1 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention), which means the PEC has no direct obligation in respect of taxes 
paid in the SC.Because the permanent establishment is not a resident of a contracting state, 
it is therefore also not recognisedfor purposes of determining the applicable treaty provisions 
in the source state. The proposed solution191 as discussed in chapter 5.2.4 is to extend 
treaty benefits to permanent establishments whereby a permanent establishment would be 
treatednot partially like a resident entity, but equally and to the same extent with regard to 
the taxing of profits and availability of benefits. Coupled with this approach of extending 
treaty benefits to permanent establishments, both the SC and the PEC would be required to 
apply the provisions of the treaty that is in place between them in relation to the income 
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attributable to the permanent establishment, thus the application of two bilateral tax treaties 
would be required, the RC-SC treaty, as well as the SC-PEC treaty.  
 
With regard to dual resident triangular cases as discussed in chapter 3, the complicating 
factor specifically related to solving such triangular cases is mostly attributable to the 
concurrent application of two bilateral tax treaties, the RC1-SC treaty as well as the RC2-SC 
treaty. The proposed solution to dual resident triangular cases as proposed by the OECD 
and supported by authors such as Avery Jones and Garcia Prats (discussed in chapter 
5.1.1) is to ensure that the allocation of residence in accordance with the treaty between the 
two residence states, RC1-RC2, is effective for purposes of treaties which the residence 
states have respectively concluded with third states, i.e. SC. This solution would prevent a 
dual resident from claiming multiple treaty benefits. 
 
An overall long-term solution to triangular cases could be to negotiate multilateral tax 
treaties. In general, the approach under multilateral treaties would be similar to the options 
available for resolving permanent establishment triangular cases by the application of 
bilateral tax treaties. All three states could be allowed to impose tax with the permanent 
establishment state and residence state being obliged to grant relief in the form of exemption 
or tax credit for taxes paid in the SC and PEC respectively or, either the permanent 
establishment state or the source state could be prevented from imposing tax on the income. 
The issue of two concurrent bilateral treaties being applicable at the same time, as well as 
the issue of which treaty the source state should apply, would be eliminated.  Multilateral 
treaties would however be practically challenging to conclude and maintain and the primary 
obstacle to concluding multilateral treaties is likely to be the difficulty involved in getting 
multiple states to agree to the terms of the treaty. 
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